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I. INTRODUCTION
For many years it was fashionable to say that international commer-
cial arbitration had come of age.1 That is no longer an appropriate ob-
servation. By now it has entered a mature and sophisticated middle
age.' Both the crises and the illusions of youth are past, and in the eyes
* Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law; Director, The Institute for Trans-
national Arbitration, a division of The Southwestern Legal Foundation.
1. See Paulsson, Introduction, 1 ARB. Ir'L 2, 2 (1985) [hereinafter Paulsson, In-
troduction] (noting that "[tihe age of innocence has come to an end for international
commercial arbitration"). See generally Aksen, International Arbitration: Its Time
Has Arrived!, 14 CASE W. REs. J. INT"L L. 247 (1982) (discussing the development of
international arbitration and the bright prospects for its future).
2. See De Vries, International Commercial Arbitration. A Transnational View, 1
J. INT'L ARB. 7, 19 (1984) (observing that "[a]s a substitute for national courts, arbi-
tration has reached a peak of legal effectiveness"). The same author had earlier ex-
pressed somewhat less exuberant views. See De Vries, International Commercial Arbi-
tration: A Contractual Substitute for National Courts, 57 TUL L. REv. 42, 79 (1982)
(noting that "international arbitration may even have reached a cyclical phase of un-
critical acceptance").
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of businessmen (although not necessarily their lawyers) the creature
has developed an identity and ability to solve problems that match the
needs of the critical role it plays in world commerce today.'
Notwithstanding the now general preference in the international
arena for arbitration in lieu of litigation, 4there are still new develop-
ments to take into account in planning and providing for dispute resolu-
tion. The process continues to evolve. One aspect of that evolution is
the emerging convergence of principles and techniques that apply to
international - or, to adopt the Philip Jessup term, "transnational" -
commercial arbitration. 5 Where one arbitrates, and who administers it,
matters less than it once did. The convergency is far from complete,
but that is the direction in which world practice is heading.'
3. See Kerr, International Arbitration v. Litigation, 1980 J. Bus. L. 164, 164
[hereinafter Kerr, International Arbitration] (noting that "arbitration has become
something of a forensic industry all over the world").
4. This statement is made on information and belief and must be accepted on faith
in the absence of statistics. It has been repeated with liturgical uniformity in almost
everything published in recent years on international commercial arbitration. See, e.g.,
Kerr, International Arbitration, supra note 3, at 165 (stating that arbitration clauses
are found in the vast majority of international commercial contracts); A. REDFERN &
M. HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 17
(1986) [hereinafter A. REDFERN & M. HUNTER] (noting that if the parties themselves
are unable to reach agreement, arbitration is the most frequently used method to re-
solve the dispute); W. STRENG & J. SALACUSE, 6 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS PLANNING:
LAW AND TAXATION § 31.01 (1982) [hereinafter W. STRENG & J. SALACUSE] (stating
that "[a]rbitration is the favored procedure for settling international business
disputes").
In this author's judgment, the Redfern and Hunter work is the most reliable and
useful single-volume treatment of international commercial arbitration in the market
today. Accord Park, Book Review, 82 Am. J. INT'L L. 616, 622-25 (1988) (stating that
the authors, Redfern & Hunter, have written the best general treatment on trends in
international commercial arbitration).
5. Judge Jessup developed and popularized (but did not invent) the term in his
Storrs Lectures, Transnational Law (Yale Law School 1956), reprinted as P. JESSUP,
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956) (defining transnational law); Schachter, Philip Jes-
sup's Life and Ideas, 80 Am. J. INT'L L. 878, 893 (1986) (discussing Judge Jessup's
development of the term "transnational"). Judge Jessup defined the title "to include all
law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers. Both public and
private international law are included, as are other rules that do not wholly fit into such
standard categories." H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS XiX
(3d ed. 1986). Not everyone fancies the term. See Mann, Book Review, 2 ARB. INT'L
378, 378 (1986) (reviewing RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES THROUGH INTER-
NATIONAL ARBITRATION (T. Carbonneau ed. 1984), and stating, "[tihere is very strong
reason to fear [the term] means nothing and is incapable of definition .... The word
'transnational' is confusing and indicates a regrettable lack of precision of thought and
language such as lawyers must be expected to eschew"). Pace Professor Mann, the
United Nations Centre for Transnational Corporations retains its original name.
6. This is often referred to as the "internationalization" or "denationalization" of
international commercial arbitration. The international commercial arbitration bar,
which includes a large number of academics, generally regards this as a desirable goal.
See Lew, Introduction, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRA-
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Responsible for much of this convergency are the major interna-
TION 1 (J. Lew ed. 1987) [hereinafter CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION] (noting that "the elimination of the restrictions and prejudices of na-
tional laws and the ability to transcend national, political and cultural differences is
fundamental for the future of international arbitration"); Coulson, The Future Growth
of Institutional Administration in International Commercial Arbitration, in THE ART
OF ARBITRATION 73, 81 (J. Schultsz & A. van den Berg eds. 1982) (observing that "it
may be appropriate for the leading agencies to rise above national and cultural differ-
ences in a sensible effort to accommodate to the emerging demands of the parties"); see
also infra text accompanying notes 246-248 (noting that international arbitrators in
different countries are making similar procedural and substantive decisions).
7. Another - but only potential - source of convergency is the Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration adopted by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) on June 21, 1985, and recommended to all
states by the United Nations General Assembly on December 11, 1985. See Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1302, 1302
(1985); 11 Y.B. CoMMi. ARB. 380, 380-90 (1986) [hereinafter Model Law] (containing
the text of the Model Law); see 2 I. KAvAss & A. LuVAK, UNCITRAL MODEL LAWV
OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY §§ 66.0-
62, 68.0-1 (1985) (compiling documents related to UNCITRAL from 1979 to the pre-
sent); INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, CONGRESS SERIES
No. 2 UNCITRAL PROJECT FOR A MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 1 (1984) (containing a draft of the Model Law and reports on the Model
Law hearings); Hoellering, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Commercial Arbitration,
20 INT'L LAW. 327, 338 (1986) (discussing background principles and features of the
Model Law, and concluding that the Model Law will serve to make international com-
mercial arbitration "more uniform"). So far, the Model Law has been adopted nation-
ally only in Canada (now in all of its component jurisdictions: federal, ten provincial,
and two territorial), Cyprus and Nigeria. See generally UNCITRAL ARBITRATION
MODEL IN CANADA (R. Patterson & B. Thompson eds. 1987) [hereinafter UNCI-
TRAL ARBITRATION MODEL IN CANADA] (presenting papers from a conference on the
settlement of international legal disputes); Kos-Rabcewicz-Zubkowski, International
Commercial Arbitration Laws in Canada, J. INT'L ARB., Sept. 1988, at 43, 47-49 (list-
ing all statutory citations except for the final two: Saskatchewan, S.S. 1988, C. 1-10.2;
and Ontario, S.O. 1988, c.30); Gregory, International Commercial Arbitration: Com-
ments on Professor Graham's Paper, 13 CAN. Bus. L.J. 42, 42 (1987-1988) (describ-
ing historical and legal background in Canada); Herrmann, For an UNCITRAL Model
Restatement of Arbitration Law in the United Kingdom, 4 ARB. INT'L 62, 64 (1988)
(the Senior Legal Officer of the UNCITRAL Secretariat in Vienna noting the adop-
tion of the model law in Cyprus and Nigeria) (the legislation referred to is the Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration Law, 1987, adopted on May 29, 1987 (Cyprus) (in En-
glish translation issued by the Cypriot Ministry of Justice); and the Arbitration and
Conciliation Decree 1988, promulgated as Decree No. 1 on March 14, 1988 (Nige-
ria)); Departmental Advisory Committee Report on UNCITRAL Model Law (United
Kingdom), reprinted in 3 INT'L ARB. REP. Doe. A (March 1988) (reporting the com-
mittee's views to the Department of Trade and Industry); Report of Working Group on
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Australia) (noting the Working
Group's views), reprinted in 2 INT'L ARB. REP. 656 (1987); Law Reform Commission
Report on the Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law of Arbitration (Hong Kong)
(reporting the views of the Law Reform Commission), reprinted in 3 INT'L ARB. REP.
Doc. B (Jan. 1988); Washington Foreign Law Society, Report on the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (United States), reprinted In 2
INT'L ARB. REP. 779, 779-828 (1987) (reporting the views of the Washington Foreign
Law Society); Gaillard, The UNCITRAL Model Law and Recent Statutes on Interna-
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tional commercial arbitration institutions: the International Chamber
of Commerce, the American Arbitration Association, the London
Court of International Arbitration, the Stockholm Chamber of Com-
merce, the various Swiss Chambers of Commerce, and the Interna-
tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (a progeny of the
World Bank, officially the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development)." There are others but these are the ones that set the
pace." How good a job are they doing?
Before attempting an answer to that question through individual sur-
vey and collective evaluation, it would be useful to summarize the sev-
eral factors that have prompted international business to rely on arbi-
tration as the normal device for dispute avoidance and settlement.
II. THE THRESHOLD DECISION: TO ARBITRATE
It might be more precise to describe the threshold decision as
whether or not to include an arbitration clause rather than whether or
not to arbitrate. Inclusion of a compromissory clause to arbitrate future
disputes quite often obviates the need to arbitrate. The clause has a
kind of in terrorem effect: its mere existence tends to promote settle-
ment short of the adversary proceedings it contemplates. Which is to
say, with a touch of hyperbole, "the best arbitration clauses are never
invoked." 10
Arbitration in this sense means "binding" arbitration.11 The award is
final, not merely a preparatory step to "serious" litigation. At least that
is the theory and that is the way it ought to be. For the most part, as
shown below, that is the way it is. Other forms of alternative dispute
resolution - ADR in the argot of the day - fall short of this. Concili-
tional Arbitration in Europe and North America, 2 ICSID REV. - FlLJ 424, 424-38
(1987) (discussing the model law in the context of its influence on other laws currently
undergoing amendment). The number of commentaries is already vast. Typical of au-
thoritative criticism from the traditional English point of view is Kerr, Arbitration and
the Courts: The UNCITRAL Model Law, 34 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 1, 19 (1985) ("let
us never leave arbitration as immune from judicial review, and the parties as defense-
less, as they would be under the present text"). The impact of the UNCITRAL model
law is not considered further in this article.
8. See infra Parts III-IX of text and accompanying notes (discussing each of those
international commercial arbitration institutions).
9. See List of Arbitral Institutions, 13 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 713, 713-37 (1988) (set-
ting forth an extensive list of arbitral institutions).
10. Lalive, Some Threats to International Investment Arbitration, 1 ICSID REv.
- FILJ 26, 26 (1986) [hereinafter Lalive, Some Threats].
11. See R. COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION - WHAT You NEED TO KNOW 8(3d ed. 1986) (noting that arbitration is usually binding, in contrast to mediation, con-
ciliation, and fact-finding); R. BERNSTEIN, HANDBOOK OF ARBITRATION PRACTICE 9(1987) (noting that an arbitration decision is enforced as though it were a court order).
[VOL. 4:319
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ation and mediation are processes that involve third-party assistance to
reach settlement but are not binding on the parties. 2 The mini-trial,
whose vogue is growing rapidly in the United States and now spreading
to Europe (the Zurich Chamber of Commerce issued mini-trial rules in
1984), is another form of non-binding ADR. There are more. 3 The
present article is not concerned with these other - and non-binding
forms of ADR. It is concerned with arbitration "proper." 4
What then are the reasons for the acceptance of arbitration as the
12. The terms "conciliation" and "mediation" are usually used interchangeably.
See G. WILNER, DOrKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.02 (rev. ed. 1984) (treat-
ing mediation and conciliation interchangeably); Smith, A Warmer Way of Disputing:
Mediation and Conciliation, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. (Supp.) 205, 205 (1978) (same).
Some authorities attempt a distinction but they cannot agree on what it is. Lord Wil-
berforce defines conciliation as the help a third party gives the contestants to reach
their own agreement, while mediation involves the further step of the third party's
making recommendations. Wilberforce, Resolving International Commercial Disputes:
The Alternatives, in UNCITRAL ARBITRATION MODEL IN CANADA, supra note 7, at
7. Two other English authorities exactly reverse the definitions. A. REDFERN & M.
HUNTEr, supra note 4, at 20. The American Arbitration Association (AAA), employ-
ing "mediation", and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), employing "con-
ciliation", define their respective terms in an almost identical sense, and include therein
third-party recommendations and proposals for settlement. AAA COMMIERCIAL MEDIA-
TION RULES 10 (The American Arbitration Association, effective Oct. 1, 1987); ICC
RULES OF OPTIONAL CONCILIATION arts. 5, 11 (The International Chamber of Com-
merce, effective Jan. 1, 1988). To the same effect as the ICC are the UNCITRAL
RULES art. 7(4). UNCITRAL, Report of the 13th Sess., 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
17) at 12-38, U.N. Doc. A/35/17 (1980). The terms have essentially identical mean-
ings in public international law as well. Sohn, The Function of International Arbitra-
tion Today, 108 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 15-20 (1963-I); cf. Bindschedler, Conciliation
and Mediation, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 47, 49 (1981)
(finding no clear distinction, but employing "mediation" for activities of states and
"conciliation" for those of private persons, and regarding "conciliation" as procedurally
more formal).
13. See S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 8-9 (1985)(listing, in table form, "primary" and "hybrid" dispute resolution processes); Perlman
& Nelson, New Approaches to the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes,
17 INT'L LAW. 215, 231-36 (1983) (listing alternative methods of dispute resolution).
14. Useful general descriptions of international commercial arbitration may be
found in C. SCHmTTHoFF, EXPORT TRADE: THE LAW & PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 574-614 (8th ed. 1986) (discussing both English and international arbitration
practice); G. DELAUME, LAW AND PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS 281-349
(1988) (reviewing various aspects of trasnational commercial arbitration); see also A.
LOWENFELD, 1 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE TRADE 85-
99 (rev. 2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter A. LOWENFELD] (discussing international commer-
cial arbitration); McClelland, International Arbitration: A Practical Guide for the Ef-
fective Use of the System for Litigation of Transnational Commercial Disputes, 12
INT'L LAW. 83, 83-103 (1978) (explaining how legal practitioners can use the interna-
tional system successfully); Vagts, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in International
Business, 203 RECUEIL DES COUPS 17, 62-84 (1987-II) (discussing the history and the
present status of trasnational arbitration). The new American Law Institute Restate-
ment (Third) of Foreign Relations Law deals generally with the subject. RESTATEIENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 487-88 (1987).
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preferred mode? A listing with very brief comment follows:1"
1. It avoids litigation in, and decision by, a biased or unfriendly for-
eign court. This assurance of neutrality is probably the principal advan-
tage of arbitration.
2. It enhances the possibility of presenting one's case to experts,
learned and experienced in the field involved. The parties choose the
judge, or they choose the institution or authority that chooses the
judge. With a court it is catch-as-catch-can.
3. It provides for greater flexibility of procedure. This can result
from the compromissory clause itself, from the procedures prescribed
by arbitral institutions, and from the decisions of arbitrators made
within the usually ample scope of their authority.
4. It is private, and it more easily allows the parties to carry on their
normal business, if that is their wish, while the dispute is pending reso-
lution. This is of particular interest to foreign parties, who are accus-
tomed to a higher level of business privacy than their American
counterparts.
5. It is probably and even normally less expensive but this cannot be
assured or assumed. Cost savings should not be automatically given
preponderant weight in the arbitration/litigation equation. Of course
individual circumstances will vary.
6. It leads to easier enforcement across national frontiers. The
United States, for instance, does not have a treaty relationship with
any other country on the recognition of foreign judgments. But under
the New York Convention of 1958 it is bound with 77 other countries
to mutual recognition of foreign arbitral awards."6
7. It can be substantially more convenient to carry out than litigation
because of the international arbitration institutions now in place. It is
the role and performance of these institutions that the remainder of
this article examines.
15. There are about as many "lists" of advantages and disadvantages as there are
articles on international commercial arbitration. See A. REDFERN & M. HUNTER,
supra note 4, at 16-20 (listing advantages of arbitration); W. STRENG & J. SALACUSE,
supra note 4, at § 30.06[A] (listing perceived advantages of arbitration over judicial
settlement). For somewhat restrained treatment see Kerr, International Arbitration,
supra note 3, at 164-65 (noting in brief the advantages of arbitration); Yates, Arbitra-
tion or Court Litigation for Private International Dispute Resolution. The Lesser of
Two Evils, in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBI-
TRATION [SIXTH SOKOL COLLOQUIUM] 224, 226-32 (T. Carbonneau ed. 1984) [herein-
after SIXTH SOKOL COLLOQUIUM] (reviewing factors in the choice between litigation
and arbitration). The listing in the text is the author's own arrangement of various
factors.
16. See infra notes 18-31 and accompanying text (discussing treaties as a struc-
tural element that supports the choice of arbitration).
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III. INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK
Three elements converge to provide the structural reason for choos-
ing arbitration as the method for settling transnational business dis-
putes: (a) major multilateral treaties make arbitral awards rendered in
one country enforceable in others (something not generally true of judi-
cial judgments except among member states of the European Commu-
nity),' 7 (b) established institutions exist to administer arbitration in an
expeditious, economical and neutral fashion, and (c) official rules of
procedure have been developed for the conduct of arbitral proceedings
that parties to contracts can adopt or that will be applicable through
simple designation by the parties of an administering institution. This
is the framework for the evaluation. First an overview.
A.
The keystone treaty is the UN Arbitration Convention of 1958, usu-
ally referred to as the New York Convention. 8 By January 1, 1989, it
17. See European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels Convention), Sept. 27, 1968,
arts. 26-30, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 229, 236-37 (1969) (sometimes referred to as the
European Full Faith and Credit Convention) (giving "full faith and credit" to judicial
decisions among EEC members); see also A. DAsHWOOD, R. HACON & R. WHITE, A
GUIDE TO THE CIVIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS CONVENTION 35 (1986) (discuss-
ing the recognition and enforcement of judgments under the Brussels Convention);
Landay, Another Look at the EEC Judgments Convention. Should Outsiders Be Wor-
ried?, 6 DICK. J. INT'L L. 25, 25 (1987) (stating that the EEC convention perpetuates
the potential for decisions against non-members of the EEC that are based on "exorbi-
tant" jurisdiction).
18. U.N. Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for
signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, re-
printed in 4 Y.B. Cohm. ARB. 226 (1979) [hereinafter New York Convention]. The
standard work on the treaty is A. VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION
CONVENTION OF 1958 338 (1981) (discussing the New York Convention from the
standpoint of its application by the courts, with an emphasis on the need for uniformity
of interpretation); see also Sanders, A Twenty Years' Review of the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 13 INT'L LAw. 269, 269-87
(1979) (describing the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under thq New York
Convention). A useful and concise summary of the Convention is found in A. REDFERN
& M. HUNTER, supra note 4, at 46-47, 343-49. A lengthy article of impressive scholar-
ship describing the convention's law-making impact in various jurisdictions is Carbon-
neau, American and Other National Variations on the Theme of International Com-
mercial Arbitration, 18 GA J. INT'L & Cohin. L. 143, 163 (1988) (general); id. at 167
(France); id. at 173 (United Kingdom); id. at 177 (Canada); id. at 188 (United
States). For issues under the Convention in United States practice, see Harnick, Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 31 A. J. Co?.Ip. L. 703, 703
(1983) (discussing United States practice). Other treaties of historical or tangential
interest such as the Geneva Protocol of 1923, the Geneva Convention of 1927, the
European Convention of 1961 (Geneva), the Moscow Convention of 1972, and various
Latin American conventions, are described in A. REDFERN & M. HUNTER, supra note
1989]
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had been accepted by 78 countries, including almost all of the major
trading nations of the world.19 Three more countries had signed but not
yet ratified the convention. The New York Convention imposes on its
parties the obligations (a) to enforce an agreement to arbitrate unless it
is found to be void, 1 and (b) to recognize foreign awards under such
agreements and enforce them by proceedings not substantially more
onerous than those applicable to domestic awards.22 Exceptions to the
award enforcement duty are few: invalidity of the arbitration agree-
ment, inability of a party to present its case, nonconformance of the
award or procedure with the agreement, or violation of public order by
enforcement of the award. 23 The full name of the treaty is the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards.
The ICSID Convention of 1965, occasionally referred to as the
Washington Convention, was formulated by the World Bank to provide
for the resolution of legal disputes arising out of private investments. 4
ICSID stands for International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes. Its headquarters is at the World Bank in Washington, D.C.
By January 1, 1989, 89 countries had accepted the treaty and eight
more had signed but not yet ratified.2 5 The dispute must be between a
"Contracting State" and a "national of another Contracting State. ' 2
Arbitration is conducted under the auspices of the World Bank. Ratifi-
cation of the convention does not of itself constitute consent to arbitra-
tion, but consent of a contracting state may be given in advance (a) by
legislation, (b) in a separate agreement between states, or (c) in an
agreement with an investor (such as a concession agreement)." A par-
4, at 43-45, 47-48.
19. Scoreboard of Adherence to Transnational Arbitration Treaties, NEws AND
NOTES FROM THE INSTITUTE FOR TRANSNATIONAL ARBITRATION (ITA) (January
1989) [hereinafter NEWS AND NOTES FROM THE INSTITUTE FOR TRANSNATIONAL ARDI-
TRATION], reprinted as an annex to this article. The author is Director of ITA and
prepares, with the much appreciated assistance of Theresa L. Glavin, its quarterly
Scoreboard.
20. Id.
21. New York Convention, supra note 18, arts. II(I), 11(3).
22. Id. art. III.
23. Id. art. V.
24. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S.
No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, reprinted in International Centre for Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes, ICSID BASIC DOCUMENTS 11 (ICSID/15 1985) [hereinafter IC-
SID Convention].
25. NEWS AND NOTES FROM THE INSTITUTE FOR TRANSNATIONAL ARBITRATION,
supra note 19 and annex to this article.
26. ICSID Convention, supra note 24, art. 25(1).
27. Id. art. 25(1); see also G. DELAUME, supra note 14, at 360 (enumerating the
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ticular feature of an ICSID arbitration award is that it is final and
binding, without exception, in contracting states. 8 Only a certified
copy need be filed with an appropriate court for judicial recognition
and enforcement.2 9 The full name of the treaty is the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States.
The Inter-American Arbitration Convention of 1975, often referred
to as the Panama Convention, is essentially the same as the New York
Convention except (a) that when an arbitration is ordered based on an
arbitration agreement, the arbitration must be conducted in accordance
with the rules of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commis-
sion (IACAC) in the absence of express party agreement otherwise,
and (b) there is no provision for judicial enforcement of arbitration
agreements in cases where a national court is already seized of an ac-
tion on the same matter.30 By January 1, 1989, 11 Latin American
several forms of consent).
28. ICSID Convention, supra note 24, arts. 53(1), 54(1).
29. Id. art. 54(2).
30. Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, opened
for signature Jan. 30, 1975, art. 3, 42 O.A.S.T.S. 1, OEA/ser. A/20 (SEPF) (1975),
reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 336, 336 (1975), also reprinted in 3 Y.B. COMm. ARP. 15, 15
(1978) [hereinafter Panama Convention]; cf. New York Convention, supra note 18,
art. II (3) (requiring courts of member states to enforce arbitration agreements); see
also 1 H. SMIT & V. PECHOTA, WORLD ARBITRATION REPORTER §§ 255.1-260 (1987)
[hereinafter H. SMIT & V. PECHOTA] (providing an excellent comparison of the New
York and Panama Conventions).
The Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission (IACAC) is a private or-
ganization, founded in 1934 to promote arbitration and conciliation in the Western
Hemisphere. Its Rules of Procedure are identical to those of UNCITRAL, except for
minor variations and the recommended compromissory clause that expressly opts for
arbitral decision ex aequo et bono (i.e., on general concepts of justice and fairness,
rather than on technical legal rights). See infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text
(describing the application of UNCITRAL Rules of Procedure). With headquarters in
Washington, D.C., in offices provided by the 32-member Organization of American
States (OAS), its primary activity at present is to promote acceptance of the New
York and Panama Conventions. IACAC's function as administrator of arbitrations has
so far been minimal. See also Eyzaguirre, Arbitration in Latin America: The Experi-
ence of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission, 4 IN'L TAx & Bus.
LAw. 288, 289, 293, 295-96 (1986) (noting the adoption, with minor changes, of UN-
CITRAL's ad hoc rules). For fuller accounts see Norberg, General Introduction to
Inter-American Commercial Arbitration, 3 Y.B. Comm. ARB. 1, 14 (1978) (with IA-
CAC Rules of Procedure reprinted at 231) (concluding that widespread acceptance of
the Panama Convention would bring uniformity to the Western Hemisphere); Norberg,
8 Y.B. CoMM. AE. 77, 80 (1983) (stating that uniformity has taken longer than the
author originally predicted, but that it is gaining momentum); Norberg, Inter-Ameri-
can Commercial Arbitration: Unicorn or Beast of Burden?, 5 PACE L. Rnv. 607, 615
(1985) (noting that IACAC's Rules of Procedure are the rules that UNCITRAL rec-
ommends, with appropriate changes for the Western Hemisphere). Charles R. Norberg
is the incumbent Director General of IACAC.
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countries had ratified the convention; six additional countries had
signed, including the United States, but not yet ratified it.31 The full
name of the treaty is the Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration.
Annexed to this article is a schedule prepared by the author that
shows the status of adherence by 172 countries to these and certain
other treaties on arbitration as of January 1, 1989.
B.
There are literally hundreds of institutions throughout the world
whose services are available to appoint arbitrators and to administer
arbitral proceedings. Most of these institutions are affiliated with local
chambers of commerce. The 1988 Yearbook of Commercial Arbitra-
tion, published by the private and prestigious International Council for
Commercial Arbitration (ICCA), lists some of the institutions that
deal with international arbitration in general."2 They are located in al-
most 50 countries. Some countries play host to several, including
France with six.
The major institutions, considered in greater detail below, are these:
-International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Paris
-American Arbitration Association (AAA), New York
-London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), London
-Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), Stockholm
-Swiss Chambers of Commerce (Concordat Group), especially Basel,
Bern, Geneva, Ticino (Lugano), and Zurich
-International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (IC-
SID), Washington, D.C.
31. See NEWS AND NOTES FROM THE INSTITUTE FOR TRANSNATIONAL ARBITRA-
TION, supra note 19, and annex to this article (listing the countries that adhere to
various transnational arbitration treaties). In the case of the United States, President
Reagan signed the instrument of ratification (with reservations) on November 10,
1986, but withheld deposit with the OAS (to complete ratification) until implementing
legislation is enacted by Congress. Signature of Instrument, 87 DEP'T ST. BULL. 90
(Jan. 1987); President's Message of June 15, 1981 to the Senate Transmitting the In-
ter-American Convention on Commercial Arbitration, 1981 PUB. PAPERS 517-18 (un-
dertaking to await enactment of legislation). The Senate consented to ratification with
the following reservations on October 9, 1986: (1) reciprocity, (2) primacy of the New
York Convention in case of conflict unless a majority of the parties are from OAS
countries that have ratified the Panama Convention, and (3) application of IACAC
Rules in effect on date of deposit unless the United States, by administrative determi-
nation, has accepted subsequent amendments. S. Res. Treaty Doc. No. 97-12, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S15,773-774 (1986) (containing Senate consent with
text of the three reservations).
32. See List of Arbitral Institutions, supra note 9, at 713 (providing an extensive
list of arbitral institutions).
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Other institutions of note are those located in Beijing, Bogota, Cairo,
Cologne, Hamburg, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, Los Angeles, Madrid,
Melbourne, Miami, Moscow, Ottawa, Rome, Rotterdam, Tokyo, Van-
couver, and Vienna. 33 Location of headquarters does not necessarily in-
dicate venue of proceedings. The ICC, for instance, conducts arbitra-
tions throughout the world, with only about a third in Paris.M
C.
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UN-
CITRAL) has issued Arbitration Rules for the conduct of arbitration
cases that can be adopted by the parties in their contracts or that can
be administered by arbitral institutions chosen by the parties. 38 In addi-
tion, each of the major arbitral institutions has rules of its own for the
arbitrations it conducts.38 Both the AAA and the LCIA will administer
33. See AAA, Survey of International Arbitration Sites 1 (1984) (discussing the
suitability of arbitration sites such as Geneva, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, London,
New York, Paris, Stockholm, Vienna, and Zurich). The volume of disputes arbitrated
in Moscow by the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission (FTAC) (in December 1987
renamed the Arbitration Court at the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry)
and the Maritime Arbitration Commission (MAC), both attached to the USSR Cham-
ber of Commerce and Industry, has been large (from 300 to 400 cases per year), but
90% of the cases have involved Eastern Bloc parties, and although it is legally possible,
no foreign citizen has ever sat as arbitrator. Hob~r, Arbitration in Moscow, 3 ARB.
INT'L 119, 121, 128 (1987) (discussing the arbitration practices of FTAC and MAC in
the Soviet Union) (the commentator is with the Stockholm office of White & Case and
has written his 45-page study in a generally non-partisan fashion); Lebedev, U.S.S.R.,
II INT'L HANDBOOK Cofmi. ARB. 4, 4 (1985) (same); Timmermans, The New Statute
on the Arbitration Court at the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 5 J. IN-r'L
ARB., Sept. 1988, at 97, 97 (same); Osakwe, The Soviet Position on International
Arbitration as a Method of Resolving International Disputes, in SIxrT SOKOL COu.O-
QtIUM, supra note 15, at 184 (same). Because of its unsuitability for genuinely "inter-
national" arbitration, Moscow is not considered further in this article. The reasons why
Tokyo has not achieved a prominence in international commercial arbitration commen-
surate with its economic importance (an average annual caseload for the Japan Com-
mercial Arbitration Association of only 13 for the period 1980-1987) are discussed in
Sawada, Practice of Arbitral Institutions in Japan, 4 ARB. INT'L 120, 123, 138-39
(1988) (the reasons include a "deeply ingrained abhorence of confrontation and the
resolution of disputes through enforceable means").
34. See infra note 44 and accompanying text (noting the high proportion of ICC
arbitrations that take place outside France).
35. UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, ARBITRATION
RULES, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (no. 17), U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976), reprinted in 2
Y.B. Comi. ARB. 161 (1977). See generally I. DORE, ARBITRATION AND CONCILIA-
TION UNDER THE UNCITRAL RULES: A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS (1986) (providing a full
length treatment of UNCITRAL's arbitration rules (with rules set forth in appendix));
see also Sanders, Procedures and Practices under the UNCITRAL Rules, 27 Am. J.
Comp. L. 453, 454-56 (1979) (discussing the scope of UNCITRAL's arbitration rules).
36. See infra Parts IV-IX (addressing the various institutions' rules). Each institu-
tion publishes its rules in booklet or pamphlet form. The rules are also collected in
various services and so-called handbooks, but these seldom keep pace with institutional
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UNCITRAL rules in place of their own if the parties so choose.31 The
same is true of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. 8 The ICC,
however, will not administer UNCITRAL rules in place of its own, but
it will act as "appointing authority" for arbitrators under UNCITRAL
rules administered by others. 9 The differences from one set of rules to
the next are not great.40 Many, including this author, prefer the UN-
CITRAL rules because of their broad acceptance and because a record
of decisions rendered under them is available in the reports of the Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal at The Hague. 1
This, then, is the stage and these are the actors and the scripts.
There follows a second and closer look at the institutions.
IV. ICC COURT OF ARBITRATION
The Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Com-
merce (ICC) is the premier institution of international arbitration in
the world today. The others fall far behind in terms of caseload and
new requests for arbitration. In 1987 the ICC Court was supervising
almost 700 pending cases.4 2 At the same time the American Arbitra-
tion Association, its nearest competitor in terms of volume, was han-
revisions. With respect to each institution discussed infra, the version of the rules re-
ferred to is indicated in the appropriate note.
37. See infra Parts V and VI of text and accompanying notes (discussing the AAA
and LCIA).
38. See infra Part VII of text and accompanying notes (discussing the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce).
39. See infra Part IV of text and accompanying notes (discussing the ICC Court of
Arbitration).
40. This has been true for some time. See Straus, The Growing Consensus on In-
ternational Commercial Arbitration, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 709, 711 (1974) (stating that
"the multiplicity of arbitration rules and institutional arrangements, when carefully
analyzed, differ very little in any essential qualities"). But differences do exist and
these should be carefully considered in drafting the compromissory clause. See Rhodes
& Sloan, The Pitfalls of International Commercial Arbitration, 17 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 19, 25-28 (1984) (discussing standard arbitration clauses in contracts under
AAA, ICC, and UNCITRAL rules).
41. See Holtzmann, Some Lessons of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, in
PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD - PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BusI-
NESS §§ 16.5, 16.14, 16.29 (3. Moss ed. 1987) [hereinafter PRIVATE INVESTORS
ABROAD] (discussing the experience of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal). The
cumulative index to the first ten volumes of reports (through April 15, 1986) lists al-
most 500 references to the Tribunal Rules. 10 IRAN-U.S.C.T.R. 400-01 (1987). The
Tribunal Rules are actually an adaptation of the UNCITRAL Rules to accommodate
the continuous nature of the tribunal's function. B6ckstiegel, Applying the UNCITRAL
Rules: The Experience of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 4 INT'L TAX &
Bus. LAW. 266, 267-69 (1986).
42. ICC ANNUAL REPORT, 1987 24 (1987). The address of the ICC Court of Arbi-
tration is 38 Cours Albert ler, 75008 Paris.
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dling somewhat more than 100 international arbitrations."
Although headquartered in Paris, the ICC arbitrations in 1987 took
place in 24 countries (with about a third in Paris), and involved parties
from 77 countries and arbitrators from 44.44 Cases were handled under
all systems of law, principally Common Law, Civil Law, and Islamic
Law. They were handled in various languages, principally English,
French, German and Spanish but also including Arabic and Japa-
nese.15 The parties themselves can determine what system of law and
what language to employ.46
The impulse for creation in 1919 of the ICC, a non-governmental
organization of businessmen, came from the French Minister of Com-
merce, Etienne CI6mentel.47 Four years later the Court of Arbitration
was founded, adopting a structure designed by Owen D. Young of the
United States Chamber of Commerce, also a non-governmental organi-
zation.4 8 From this initial "western" and private focus, the Court had
reached the point in 1987 where one-third of ICC arbitration parties
were from developing nations and one-sixth were state or state-con-
trolled entities.49
President of the ICC Court is Michel Gaudet, formerly chief legal
adviser of the Commission of the European Economic Community and
43. Letter from AAA President Robert Coulson to author (Feb. 24, 1988) [herein-
after Coulson Letter].
44. ICC ANNUAL REPORT, 1987, supra note 42, at 24; Telex from ICC Court of
Arbitration Secretary General Stephen R. Bond to author (Feb. 25, 1988) [hereinafter
Telex] (relating that about a third of all ICC arbitrations take place in Paris).
45. Telex, supra note 44.
46. See ICC RuLES OF ARBITRATION arts. 13(3) and 15(3) (International Cham-
ber of Commerce, effective Jan. 1, 1988) [hereinafter ICC RULES] (noting that parties
to an ICC arbitration may choose the applicable laws and languages that govern the
arbitration). If the parties do not determine these matters, the arbitrator will. Id.; W.
CRAIG, NV. PARK & J. PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMNBERCE ARiTRA-
TION §§ 7.03-7.04 (1984) [hereinafter W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON] (same).
This is the only full-length work in English on ICC arbitration. A new edition was
scheduled for autumn 1988. See infra note 246 and accompanying text (noting that a
supplemental looseleaf version is also published).
47. See W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON, supra note 46, at xvii-xviii (discuss-
ing the creation of the ICC); Ceyrac, Welcome Address, in INTERNATIONAL ARiTRA-
TION: 60 YEARS OF ICC ARBITRATION: A LOOK AT THE FUTURE 19-20 (1984) (same).
48. See W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON, supra note 46, at xvii-xviii (discuss-
ing the origins of the ICC Court of Arbitration).
49. The one-sixth estimate is given by ICC representatives. Address by Stephen R.
Bond, Arbitration of International Commercial Disputes Under the Auspices of the
International Chamber of Commerce 5 (June 6, 1988) (unpublished speech delivered
by ICC Court of Arbitration Secretary General in Beijing) [hereinafter S. Bond] (not-
ing the one-sixth estimate). ICC representatives will frequently employ the fraction
one-third in reference to state and state-controlled entities. The facile reconciliation is
that one-sixth refers to parties and one-third refers to cases (in which only one of the
parties is a state or state-controlled entity).
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later president of both the French and the European Insurance As-
sociations.50 The seven vice-presidents of the Court are from Egypt, In-
dia, Lebanon, Mexico, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States3
There are 44 other members, 52 all appointed by ICC "national commit-
tees" representing more than 7,000 enterprises in over 110 countries. 3
The Court, which meets in plenary session once a month and in three-
member administrative committee twice a month, oversees the work of
the arbitrators, who are appointed on a case-by-case basis. The Court is
thus not a "court" in the usual sense; its role is to supervise arbitration
rather than to perform it.
Balancing party autonomy with professional supervision of proceed-
ings is the distinguishing feature of ICC arbitration. Under the ICC
Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration, the parties are free to agree on
their own law, to designate the members of their own arbitral tribunal,
and to determine the place of arbitration." If the parties fail to do so,
the Court of Arbitration or the arbitrator, depending on the precise
issue, steps in to supply the missing element.
The Court of Arbitration (a) screens requests for arbitration to de-
termine if there exists a prima facie agreement to arbitrate, (b) ap-
proves the "Terms of Reference" prepared by the arbitrator and the
parties, (c) monitors the arbitration proceedings, and (d) scrutinizes
the award prepared by the arbitrator. The Terms of Reference require-
ment and the scrutiny of the draft award are unique to ICC
arbitration.
The Terms of Reference, which define the contested issues and settle
procedural details, are drawn up by the arbitrator and agreed to by the
parties.55 If one party refuses to sign, and the Court regards the Terms
as adequate, the Court will set a time limit for signature by the recalci-
trant party, after which the arbitration will proceed whether or not the
default has been cured.58
The advantages of the Terms of Reference requirement are said to
be these: the issues are clearly defined in a single document for both
the parties and the arbitrator (and for the Court of Arbitration as
well); the meeting to prepare and sign the document serves the ancil-
50. Based on biographical material supplied to the author by the ICC Secretariat.
51. ICC ANNUAL REPORT, 1987, supra note 42, at 24.
52. Id.
53. Telex from Stephen R. Bond, ICC Court of Arbitration Secretary General, to
author 1 (Sept. 1, 1988).
54. ICC RULES, supra note 46, art. 12 (providing that the parties may specifiy the
place of arbitration).
55. Id. arts. 13(1) and 13(2).
56. Id. art. 13(2).
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lary function of a pre-trial conference, at which issues can be narrowed
or even resolved, sometimes in their entirety; and the Terms serve as a
separate compromis to arbitrate for those jurisdictions, mostly Arab or
Latin American, that prohibit an agreement to arbitrate future
disputes.5"
Scrutiny of the arbitrator's draft award by the Court of Arbitration
covers both form and substance. This is the much vaunted "quality
control." The Court itself may modify the award as to form, including,
inter alia, arithmetical calculations, internal consistency, and typo-
graphical or linguistic errors, and "without affecting the arbitrator's
liberty of decision, may draw his attention to points of substance."'0 3
The purpose of the substantive review and "drawing attention" is to
render the award as invulnerable as possible to attack in any subse-
quent judicial proceedings.59 In appreciation of this, arbitrators gener-
ally pay respectful attention to the Court's comments on substance. In
the rare cases - about 0.5 % - when a national court has annulled an
ICC award or refused to enforce it, the Court of Arbitration had gen-
erally drawn the arbitrator's attention to the relevant point. It is esti-
mated that 90% of all awards are honored voluntarily by the losing
party. Only about 5 % are ever challenged in the courts. 0
Key to the operation of the ICC system is the Secretariat, composed
of some 25 specialists in arbitration. The Secretary General, currently
Stephen R. Bond, assigns a "team" to each case on the docket. The
team, headed by an ICC "Counsel," assists the Court, the arbitrator,
the parties, and the parties' counsel. The General Counsel, Guillermo
Aguilar Alvarez, is responsible for legal research and information. The
Secretariat is the main channel of communication between the Court
and those involved directly in the arbitration."'
The ICC amended its Rules, effective January 1, 1988, with fees and
57. See W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAoLSSON, supra note 46, at 59-66, §§ 15.01-
15.04 (discussing the Terms of Reference); see also Goekjian, ICC Arbitration from a
Practitioner's Perspective, 14 GEo. WASH. U. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 407, 416-18 (1980)
(noting that the Terms of Reference can also serve as a vehicle for resolving key proce-
dural issues such as timing and manner of submitting evidence and briefs). To be of
advantage the Terms of Reference should be "drafted as minutely as any contact".
Goldsmith, How to Draft Terms of Reference, 3 ARE. INVTL 298, 299 (1987).
58. ICC RULES, supra note 46, art. 21.
59. See W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON, supra note 46, § 2.03 (noting that
every effort must be made "to make sure that the award is enforceable at law").
60. Id.
61. See S. Bond, supra note 49, at 9-11 (describing the structure of the Secretariat
and its functions); see also Hancock, The ICC Court of Arbitration, 1 J. INTL ArB.
21, 26 (1984) (stating that "[t]he Secretariat provides the institutional memory of the
Court").
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administrative costs that are generally considered somewhat higher
than those of other institutions, although the margin is such that this
might not be true in any given case. 2
Comparison of the major arbitral institutions inter se is an endeavor
that is largely futile, perhaps even fatuous, and not germane to the
purpose of this survey, which is to evaluate their performance as a
group. If anything, the sharper the perceived differences among the in-
stitutions, the greater the likelihood that they are serving their collec-
tive function by providing variety of choice. There is, nevertheless, one
distinction of the ICC that must be remarked: it is the most frequently
and severely criticized institution in the group. Its prominence and even
predominance have guaranteed it.
A fair sampling of complaints would include the following: adminis-
trative charges are too high; arbitrator fees should be based on time
expended rather than amount in controversy; interest should be paid on
party deposits; the selection of neutral arbitrators through the national
committees unduly limits the pool of potential arbitrators; the screening
of potential arbitrators is performed by administrative personnel lack-
ing in long-term experience; the ICC relies inordinately for its arbitra-
tors on an "in-group" of familiar figures; the rules are unnecessarily
restrictive of party autonomy; the preparation of terms of reference
leads to delay and premature definition of issues; and the scrutiny of
draft awards is a cumbersome and less efficacious device than judicial
correction of egregious abuse or error.6
62. See Triebel, ICC Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation of 1988, 3 INT'L ARD.
REP. 19, 19-28 (1988) (commenting on the ICC Rules of 1988). The minimum and
maximum fee amounts for sole arbitrator at the indicated amounts in controversy (left-
hand column) are as follows:
$ 100,000 $ 1,750 to $ 8,000
1,000,000 7,450 to 30,000
10,000,000 21,450 to 78,000
Corresponding ICC administrative expenses are now these:
$ 100,000 $ 3,500
1,000,000 14,500
10,000,000 30,000
Until recently, the charges for administrative expenses covered non-arbitration ex-
penses of the ICC that were considered beneficial to international business in general.
The practice was severely criticized and stoutly defended. See Stevenson, An Introduc-
tion to ICC Arbitration, 14 GEo. WASH. U.J. INT'L L. & ECON. 381, 400 (1980)(discussing criticisms and defenses of the practice). Addition of this "overhead" has
apparently been discontinued. Paulsson, Arbitration Under the Rules of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce, in SIXTH SOKOL COLLOQUIUM, supra note 15, at 277-
78. But the issue of no interest on deposits for costs remains. See infra notes 63-64 and
accompanying text (discussing the amended ICC Rules and their critics).
63. See, not necessarily endorsing the criticism, Ehrenhaft, Effective International
Commercial Arbitration, 9 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1191, 1205 (1977) (discussing
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Apart from the policy of not paying interest on deposits, which is
hard to defend, each of the criticisms has its reciprocal: one gets what
one pays for; arbitration fees based on amount in dispute encourage
expeditious handling of cases; involvement of national committees en-
larges rather than reduces the pool of available arbitrators; screening of
potential arbitrators by administrative staff is better than ad hoc
screening by the parties; "in-group" is simply a pejorative term for
those who have demonstrated their competence and suitability; a fair
degree of precision in the rules, updated periodically in response to con-
sumer demand, removes ambiguities and guides arbitrators who may be
expert on substance but less than fully knowledgeable on procedural
refinements; preparing terms of reference is procedurally economical
and affords opportunity for the parties to settle in advance the less con-
tested issues in controversy; and formal scrutiny of the draft award is
the most effective way to apply the ICC's accumulated experience to
assure enforceability without judicial challenge.
The critics are of two types. There are those who in the name of
party autonomy would denature the essential and distinguishing ingre-
dients of ICC arbitration. They should, to invoke ecclesiastical analogy,
worship elsewhere, where the Order of Service and liturgy are more to
their taste. There are others, however, who, professing the creed, would
adapt it to the ever-evolving needs of transnational business. To them
the ICC has been, in the main, responsive." Further changes in this
Terms of Reference); Goekjian, supra note 57, at 416-18 (same); Paulsson, supra note
62, at 271 (same), 272-79 (discussing fees, costs and interest on deposits); Smit, The
Future of International Commercial Arbitration: A Single Transnational Institution?,
25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 9, 18-20 (1986) (discussing selection of arbitrators), 20-
22 (discussing the rules), 25-28 (discussing institutional supervision); Stevenson, supra
note 62, at 391 (discussing the "in-group"), 396-97 (discussing terms of reference), 400(discussing "overhead" charges). For a rather lurid account of two ICC "horror sto-
ries" see Kerr, International Arbitration, supra note 3, at 172-75 (describing one case
of more than 15 years' duration involving multiple venues, laws, fora, and arbitrators of
different nationalities, and another of 11 years' duration involving some five years of
enforcement effort).
64. Changes made as of July 1, 1986 and incorporated into Appendix III to the
Rules as of January 1, 1988 include a cap on administrative costs of S50,500 (the cost
for an amount in controversy of $50,000,000); the substitution of a two-step deposit for
costs, with 50% (25% from each party) payable when the arbitrator is seized of the
case but the second 50% (again, 25% from each party) not payable until completion
of the Arbitrator's Terms of Reference; and acceptability of bank guaranty when one
party has fully paid in cash 100% of its half of the costs and must then cover all or
part of a defaulting party's share of the deposit required (thus eliminating pro tanto
the problem of no interest on deposits). To activate the entire process a claimant must
pay $2,000 at the time of filing that is non-refundable but creditable to the deposit for
costs.
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category do not want for advocates.6 5
The conclusion of the authors of the standard "outside" work in En-
glish on ICC arbitration is that "although of course parties often feel
they should have fared better, there is a widespread acceptance that
ICC arbitral decisions generally do justice on the merits.","
In addition to administering arbitrations under its own rules, the
ICC Court of Arbitration will also act as "appointing authority" for
arbitrators who are to function in an ad hoc context, that is, without
institutional supervision, under the Arbitration Rules recommended by
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCI-
TRAL Rules). 7
V. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
Next in order of importance, from the standpoint of international
caseload, is the American Arbitration Association (AAA)." s It is not
the typical institution or center for promotion of arbitration and con-
duct of arbitral proceedings. Of such there are hundreds throughout
the world. The AAA, which began in the typical way more than 60
years ago, has become sui generis.69 It is now a vast and diverse not-
for-profit private organization that in 1987 alone administered more
than 52,000 arbitrations, mediations, mini-trials, and elections, drawing
upon a pool of arbitrators and mediators that exceeds 60,000.0
With headquarters in New York and branch offices in 33 cities
throughout the United States, it performs its arbitration services under
65. See Triebel, supra note 62, at 27-28 (urging clarification on whether parties
may agree to deviate from the ICC Rules and whether an arbitral tribunal may meet
elsewhere than at "place of arbitration"; commenting on the elimination of reference to
conflict of laws rules; stating that the winning party should be assured of collecting its
legal costs); Werner, Remuneration of Arbitrators by the International Chamber of
Commerce, J. INT'L ARB., Sept. 1988, at 135 (stating that where the amount in dispute
is low, arbitrators are underpaid; that a time-spent basis should be adopted; that arbi-
trators should be paid as their work is performed, not when proceedings are terminated;
that the Court of Arbitration should provide, at the beginning of proceedings, an esti-
mate of probable minimum costs).
66. W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON, supra note 46, at § 1.08.
67. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, GUIDE TO ARBITRATION 54-55
(1983) (discussing the ICC as Appointing Authority under the UNCITRAL Rules).
Only one request for appointment of an arbitrator pursuant to the UNCITRAL Rules
was received in 1987. ICC ANNUAL REPORT, 1987, supra note 42, at 24-25.
68. In 1987, the AAA handled some 100-plus international cases. Coulson Letter,
supra note 43. During the same period, the ICC processed about 700 cases. ICC AN-
NUAL REPORT, 1987, supra note 42, at 24. The headquarters of the AAA is at 140
West 51st Street, New York, N.Y. 10020-1203.
69. AAA, 50TH ANNIVERSARY 1926-1976 (1976).
70. AAA, 1985-86 ANNUAL REPORT 1-3 (1987); Coulson Letter, supra note 43, at
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a variety of rules: commercial, construction, grain, patent, real estate
valuation, accident claims, and textiles.7 1 Of particular interest to inter-
national lawyers are the supplementary procedures for international
commercial arbitration 2 and the alternative procedures for cases it will
administer under the UNCITRAL rulesY3 In addition to separate
brochures containing its various rules, the AAA also publishes a num-
ber of other pamphlets, books and articles on the conduct of arbitra-
tion. One of exceptional value is "The Arbitrator's Role in Expediting
the Large and Complex Commercial Case.174
As the enforceability of clauses for the arbitration of future disputes
has gained almost universal acceptance in the United States, and as the
United States Supreme Court has continued to enlarge the range of
permissible issues for arbitration (including now even such public law
matters as antitrust7 5 and securities regulation"), the AAA has become
the cutting edge of the movement called "alternative dispute resolu-
tion" (ADR). ADR includes mediation, conciliation, mini-trials (i.e.,
simulated litigation in the presence of an "adviser," who formulates
non-binding recommendations for settlement based on the likely result
71. THE WORLD ARBITRATION INSTITUTE, AAA, INTERNATIONAL COMrERCIAL
ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK 9-10 (J. McClendon & R. Goodman eds. 1986) [herein-
after WORLD ARBITRATION INSTITUTE]; see R. COULSON, supra note 11, at 1 (provid-
ing details on commercial, construction, accident claims, and textiles); G. WILNER,
supra note 12, at § 2.02 (same). The current AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules were
amended as of September 1, 1988.
72. WORLD ARBITRATION INSTITUTE, supra note 71, at 217-19.
73. Id. at 219-255.
74. Available from the AAA. It is a reprint of Poppleton, The Arbitrator's Role in
Expediting the Large and Complex Commercial Case, ARB. J., Dec. 1981, at 6, 6-10.
In spite of the title, much of the commentary and advice is applicable to cases that are
not "large and complex."
75. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 614
(1985), appeal after remand, 814 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987). Commentaries on the deci-
sion have reached torrential proportions. A convenient place to begin is Von Mehren,
From Vynior's Case to Mitsubishi: The Future of Arbitration and Public Law, 12
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 583, 583 (1986) (discussing the decision of the Supreme Court
in Mitsubishi). For an academically impressive but occasionally intemperate assault on
the decision, see Carbonneau, Mitsubishi: the Folly of Quixotic Internationalism, 2
ARB. INT'L 116, 116-39 (1986) (stating, inter alia, that Mitsubishi contains a doctrine
that "is excessive and does injustice to the domestic interest in public law by minimiz-
ing the public policy character of antitrust regulation"). For a response, analytically
incisive and somewhat avuncular in tone, see Lowenfeld, The Mitsubishi Case: An-
other View, 2 ARB. INT'L 178, 179 (1986) (stating in part. "[c]omes now Professor
Carbonneau, hitherto known as an internationalist, to say that the Supreme Court has
blundered, seduced by 'quixotic internationalism' to arrive at an unworkable and un-
sound result .... With all respect for Professor Carbonneau, I disagree"). The
Carbonneau-Lowenfeld exchange is thoughtful, constructive, and even exhilarating.
76. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, reh'g denied,
108 S. Ct. 31 (1987).
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of actual court litigation), and a variety of other techniques designed to
facilitate fruitful negotiation and settlement.77
International commercial arbitration is thus only a small part of the
AAA's overall caseload. In 1987, 106 international cases were filed,
with 44 of them in the New York office. 8 Involved in the cases were
parties from Canada, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the United King-
dom, and 32 other countries." Six cases involved no Americans.8"
A notable feature of AAA arbitration is that arbitrators are not re-
quired to render a "reasoned" award; that is, they do not need to write
opinions explaining the reasons for their decisions unless the arbitral
clause or compromis requires it."' They may do so if they wish, espe-
cially if both parties request it, but the AAA discourages the practice.
As explained by Robert Coulson, AAA's long-time President, "Written
opinions can be dangerous because they identify targets for the losing
party to attack . . . . Usually the parties look to an arbitrator for a
decision, not an explanation." 82
Unreasoned awards, however, are considered contrary to ordre pub-
lic in some Civil Law jurisdictions and therefore unenforceable. Also,
parties in international cases often expect a written opinion. As prece-
dent an opinion can be especially useful in the case of form contracts. 83
To provide for this, the AAA's Supplementary Procedures for Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration, first issued in 1981, declare that "[t]he
AAA will make arrangements for such an opinion in consultation with
77. AAA, 1983-1984 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1985); AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSoCi-
ATION, RESOLVING YOUR DISPUTES 1 (1986).
78. Coulson Letter, supra note 43, at 1 (reporting the number of international
cases filed with the AAA in 1987).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. WORLD ARBITRATION INSTITUTE, supra note 71, at 125.
82. R. COULSON, supra note 11, at 29. A survey of American international law-
yers and business managers that the AAA conducted in 1981 indicates that this might
not be entirely true of those engaged in international arbitration. Coulson, Survey of
International Arbitration, in ARBITRATION & THE LAW, 1981 228, 243 (1981) [herein-
after Coulson, Survey of International Arbitration].
83. See A. REDFERN & M. HUNTER, supra note 4, at 294-95 (1986) (discussing
the usefulness of reasoned awards); M. MUSTILL & S. BOYD, THE LAW AND PRACTICE
OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND 541-43 (1982) (same); Carbonneau, Ren-
dering Arbitral Awards with Reasons: The Elaboration of a Common Law of Interna-
tional Transactions, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 579, 603-14 (1985) (same); Lew,
The Case for Publication of Arbitration Awards, in THE ART OF ARBITRATION, supra
note 6, at 223, 229-31 (same); Bingham, Reasons and Reasons for Reasons: Differ-
ences Between a Court Judgment and an Arbitration Award, 4 INT'L ARB. 141, 152-54
(1988) (stating that the parties are entitled to a reasoned decision but not a legal
dissertation).
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the parties and the arbitrators."'" The Procedures do not say what hap-
pens if only one party requests the written opinion. It is understood,
unofficially, that AAA practice in such cases is to allow the arbitrator
to decide, after hearing argument . 5
AAA commercial arbitration is considered relatively economical and
speedy, with a minimum of institutional involvement during and after
the proceedings. After surveying the available institutions and rules,
two authorities concluded that "international commercial arbitrations
administered by the AAA, conducted under either the AAA or UNCI-
TRAL rules and subject to U.S. arbitration laws, are [the] best. . . to
provide the parties with the most efficient and effective system of alter-
native dispute resolution that will achieve the 'orderliness and predict-
ability essential to any international business transaction.' "80 This, it
should be noted, is from the standard study on the subject, but of
course it does not factor in the numerous special elements that will be
present in any given relationship. Nationality of the parties is only one
example."'
84. AAA SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES FOR INTERNATIONAL COMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION Rule 7 (American Arbitration Ass'n 1986) [hereinafter AAA SUPPLEMEN-
TARY PROCEDURES]; WORLD ARBITRATION INSTITUTE, supra note 71, at 219.
85. Interview with Robert Coulson, AAA President, (June 18, 1987).
86. Stein & Wotman, International Commercial Arbitration in the 1980s: A Com-
parison of the Major Arbitral Systems and Rules, 38 Bus. LAW. 1685, 1687-88
(1983). For a concise summary of American arbitration law, see Hoellering, Provisions
of U.S. Law on Arbitration Agreements, in AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ARBITRATION & THE LAW, 1987-88, 170 (1988) (summarizing American arbitration
law). In AAA practice, the fee of a party-appointed arbitrator is determined by agree-
ment between the arbitrator and the party making the appointment. (This results from
the failure of the AAA Rules to cover the subject.) Neutral arbitrators formerly served
without fee in most domestic cases (at least for the first few days) but this was changed
on September 1, 1988 to exclude only the first day from "appropriate" compensation.
In international cases the AAA will "make arrangements... in consultation with the
parties and the arbitrators". AAA PROCEDURES FOR INTERNATIONAL COM,IERCIAL
ARBITRATION Rule 50 (effective Sept. 1, 1988) [hereinafter AAA PROCEDURES] (for-
merly AAA Rule 51 (effective Jan. 1, 1988)); AAA SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES,
supra note 84, at 8. In the 1981 Survey conducted by the AAA, less than half the
respondents indicated a specific figure for arbitrator fees (neutral and party-appointed).
Of those answers, the high was $1,020 per day and the low $354 per day, with an
average of $670. Coulson, Survey of International Arbitration, supra note 82, at 244.
The present author, without benefit of formal survey, estimates that the average for
1988 would be on the order of $1,000 (with "bulges" of over $2,000). AAA adminis-
trative charges (in addition to a filing fee of $300) are, in the following selected
amounts in dispute, the amounts indicated in parentheses: $100,000 (S1,750);
$1,000,000 ($4,250); and $10,000,000 ($19,250). No fee is due on the portion of a
claim exceeding $50,000,000. In case of "extreme hardship", the AAA may defer or
reduce the administrative fee. AAA ADMINISTRATIVE FEE SCHEDULE; AAA PROCE-
DURES, supra, Rule 48.
87. Objection to some aspect of United States law as the lex arbitri is obviously
another important element. The interrelationship of federal, state, and treaty law in the
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Published criticism of the AAA has been almost non-existent. What
there is, is muted. There are several reasons for this. First, its perform-
ance has been unusually sensitive to the needs of a dominant and rela-
tively homogeneous clientele, American businessmen; it changes its
rules and guidelines with remarkable dispatch. Changes were promul-
gated twice in 1988 alone. Second, with international arbitration only a
small fraction of the AAA's overall caseload (100-plus cases out of
52,000, as noted above), what institutional criticism there is has fo-
cused on its non-international affairs.88 Third, given its highly unstruc-
tured and laissez-faire approach, and the corresponding enhancement
of the role of individual arbitrators and particular arbitrations, it is
difficult to formulate generalized weaknesses; complaints will be more
discrete, more "intimate." And fourth, expectations of the parties are
more clearly defined when they have already crossed the threshold of
AAA selection; disappointments, and therefore criticisms, will be
fewer.
This is not to say that the AAA enjoys - or should enjoy - immu-
nity. Its practice of serving as an insulating but largely ministerial
mailbox between neutral arbitrators and parties, for instance, has been
sharply attacked.89 So has its requirement that an award always be
rendered by majority, rather than permitting the neutral chairman to
decide by himself in its absence.90 It is possible, moreover, that re-
sponse to more targeted criticism could lead to a larger international
caseload. There are obvious limits to this. Parties from the United
States are major actors in the transnational arbitral process, and the
United States is not therefore a neutral jurisdiction for cases that in-
volve them, even though all of the arbitrators may be third-country
nationals.
Exemplary of AAA flexibility, and willingness to experiment if not to
improvise, is the dispute resolved on September 25, 1987 between In-
ternational Business Machines Corporation (IBM), the largest com-
puter company in the world, and Fujitsu Limited, the largest computer
company in Japan. The dispute involved computer software copy-
rights. 1 The IBM-Fujitsu arbitration was unusual, and even unique,
United States is set forth with clarity and authority in the 1987 study prepared by the
Washington Foreign Law Society, supra note 7. See also Carbonneau, supra note 18,
at 188-238 (providing an excellent summary).
88. Perhaps one indication that the AAA's international practice is something less
than high-profile is that its 1987-1988 Annual Report makes only passing reference to
international arbitration. AAA ANNUAL REPORT, 1987-1988 11 (1988).
89. Smit, supra note 63, at 26-27 n.91, 100.
90. Smit, Book Review, 34 AM. J. CoMP. L. 395, 399 n.32 (1986).
91. AAA, Order of Sept. 15, 1987, Case No. 13T-117-0636-85, at 1 (available
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in many respects:
1. In the words of one arbitrator, there were "vast sums of money at
issue" in a "high stakes commercial conflict" that involved "not incon-
siderable cultural differences."9 It was a very large and complex case.
2. The arbitrators and the parties' counsel were leading figures in their
fields. The focus of talent was extraordinarily intense.
3. The award, actually denominated an "order," was rendered by only
two rather than three arbitrators. Originally there were three, with the
two "survivors" each appointed by a different party, but by agreement
the two were converted into "neutral" arbitrators without the right of
individual ex parte communication with parties. The third arbitrator,
who had been appointed by the other two, resigned to accommodate the
revised structure.
4. At a certain point in the proceedings the arbitrators transformed
themselves into temporary mediators and facilitated the agreement that
culminated in the award they eventually issued as arbitrators. Nor-
mally, a mixture of the two roles is scrupulously avoided. 3
5. The arbitrators' award was not only supported by a "reasoned"
opinion but both award and opinion were made public through press
conference announcement. An arbitrators' report, moreover, was pub-
lished in full-page advertisements in The New York Times and The
Wall Street Journal (September 15, 1987) and in Japanese translation
in Nihon Keizai Shimbun and Asahi Shimbun (September 18, 1987).
6. The award retained for the arbitrators an important continuing
function for up to 10 years and jurisdiction to arbitrate disputes for 15
years. The award was as much a beginning as an ending.
7. In effect, the award, and the rules and procedures established under
it, will constitute the applicable intellectual property law for the par-
ties, regardless of any copyright decisions of United States or Japanese
from the AAA). For brief but authoritative description of the case, see Coulson, Signif-
icance of the IBM-Fujitsu Software Award, in ARBITRATION & THE LAw (1987-1988)
224 (1988) [hereinafter Coulson, IBM-Fujitsu Award] (describing the case). An im-
plementing order, specifying dollar amounts to be paid by Fujitsu to IBM, was issued
on November 29, 1988. Markoff, Software Arbitration Ruling Gives IBM $833 Mil-
lion From Fujitsu, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1988, at 1; Miller, Fujitsu's Payments to
IBM to Resolve Software Battle Will Total $833.2 Million, Wall St. J., Nov. 30,
1988, at A3 (characterizing the arbitrators' approach as "maverick" and a radical de-
parture from the usual ways of resolving business disputes).
92. AAA Press Release, Sept. 15, 1987 (remarks of Prof. Robert H. Mnookin).
93. The September 1, 1988 AAA Rules, for the first time, contemplate inclusion of
a mediation "segment" if parties agree, but the mediator must not be an arbitrator
appointed to the case. AAA RULE 10 (1988) (in fine). Presumably the parties can
agree otherwise, as they did in IBM-Fujitsu. Coulson, IBM-Fujitsu Award, supra note
91, at 224.
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Courts. The very difficult question of which elements of a computer
operating system program represent "expression" protected under
copyright law and which elements represent unprotected "ideas" will
be determined, for purposes of the ongoing IBM-Fujitsu relationship,
by the arbitrators and not by the courts. The problem is one that courts
have only begun to address.
8. The celerity of resolution was remarkable, even for arbitration.
Elapsed time from demand for arbitration to issuance of the award was
26 months. From first hearings to award was only 19 months. The arbi-
trators accomplished this by avoiding "becoming engulfed in an exten-
sive adjudicatory fact-finding process with respect to hundreds of pro-
grams." 94 Such a process would have risked "missing the forest for the
trees."9 5 For the arbitrators, the parties, and the parties' customers, the
future mattered more than the past.
The AAA and its leadership, as the foregoing illustrates, are both
creative and aggressive. The President, Robert Coulson, is a well-
known and well-traveled figure in international arbitration circles. He
joined the AAA in 1963 and has been its full-time President since
1972. A graduate of Yale University (1950) and Harvard Law School
(1953), he is a member of the International Council for Commercial
Arbitration (ICCA) and the author of numerous works on arbitration
and alternative dispute resolution.9" The chief legal authority for the
AAA is General Counsel Michael F. Hoellering, a graduate of Colum-
bia Law School (1959) and frequent speaker and writer on interna-
tional arbitration.97
VI. LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
Arbitration in London, like the hymn-book of the Anglican Church,
is "Ancient & Modern Revised." Ancient because as early as the
twelfth century English courts were refusing to hear cases that parties
had already submitted to arbitration. 8 Modern because, when England
became the center of world trade in the nineteenth century and
"[d]isputes to be settled by arbitration in London" became the shortest
94. AAA, Opinion of Arbitrators of Sept. 15, 1987, Case No. 13T-1 17-0636-85, at
11 (available from the AAA).
95. Id.
96. Based on biographical material supplied to the author by the AAA.
97. Id. Since 1981 the AAA General Counsel's annual report has been published
under the title Arbitration & the Law, followed by the year. A separate section is
devoted to international arbitration. See supra notes 82, 86 (citing to ARBITRATION &
THE LAW).
98. G. WILNER, supra note 12, at Practice Guide § 82.03.
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and most widely used arbitration clause in international commerce,
Parliament responded in a series of statutes that culminated in the Ar-
bitration Act 1950, the basis of today's arbitral regime in England and
Wales. 9 And Revised because the Arbitration Act 1979 offers the pos-
sibility, through "exclusion agreements," of providing a process that is
perhaps the most autonomous - that is, unfettered by judicial review
- in the world.100 The Swiss have now decided to challenge London on
this.101
Authoritative estimates place the number of international arbitra-
tions conducted annually in the United Kingdom at more than 10,000,
mostly in London.102 This is by far the greatest number for any venue
in the world. Many of these arbitrations are performed for their mem-
bers by professional bodies and trade associations. There are, however,
three institutions whose work solely or principally concerns commercial
arbitration: the London Maritime Arbitrators Association (successor in
1960 to the Baltic Exchange Panel of Arbitrators), the Chartered Insti-
tute of Arbitrators (founded in 1915), and the London Court of Inter-
national Arbitration (so styled since 1981 but founded 89 years earlier
as the London Chamber of Arbitration). 13
The London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) is probably
the oldest arbitration institution in the world. Formerly managed by
99. J. Steyn, England, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION 1-2 (1988).
100. See Schmitthoff, The United Kingdom Arbitration Act 1979, 5 Y.B. Co.I?, .
Arm. 231, 233-37 (1980) (outlining the main reforms introduced by the 1979 Act); see
Crawford & Feldman, American Perceptions of London as a Situs for International
Commercial Arbitration, 2 Ar. INT'L 232, 232 (1986) (discussing the Act); Jarvin,
London as a Place for International Arbitration, 1 J. INT'L ARD. 59, 59 (1984) (same).
But cf. Samuel, Developments in English Arbitration Law Since the 1984 Antaios De-
cision, 5 J. INT'L AR. 9, 33 (Sept. 1988) (stating that "English law is still trying to
untangle itself from the consequences of a history of tight court control in this area").
For a negative view of the Arbitration Act 1979 see Smedresman, The Arbitration Act,
1979, 11 J. MAR. L. & COM. 319, 319 (1980) (stating that the Arbitration Act 1979 is
a "half-hearted statute" that will probably not attract arbitration to England).
101. See infra Part VIII (describing arbitration in Switzerland). An even greater
statutory challenge to London, not considered in this article, is that from Belgium,
which in 1985 simply excluded the jurisdiction of Belgian courts when none of the
parties have a Belgian contact. Judicial Code art. 1717(4), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 725,
726 (1986). See Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound in Belgium, 2 ARB. INT'L 68, 68
(1986) (stating that "Belgium ... has gone the whole route").
102. J. Steyn, supra note 99, at 3. The figure of 10,000 for only "international"
arbitrations is based on a telephone conversation with LCIA Registrar B.W. Vigrass on
October 15, 1987 [hereinafter Vigrass, Telephone Interview].
103. J. Steyn, supra note 99, at 2-4; see also R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 367-
68 (describing the English institutions involved in international arbitration). Headquar-
ters of the LCIA is (since December 1987) at 30-32 St. Mary Axe, London EC3A
8ET.
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the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (CIARB), but now indepen-
dent,104 its President is Lord Justice Michael R.E. Kerr of the Court of
Appeal. Chief Executive and Registrar is B.W. Vigrass. General spon-
sorship of the LCIA rests with representatives of CIARB, the London
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Corporation of the City
of London.10 5 Current international caseload of the LCIA is about 60
cases per year.106 This is little more than one-half the caseload of the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) in New York and less than
one-tenth that of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in
Paris. 107
The LCIA acts as appointing authority for arbitrators and as arbi-
tration administrator. It may do both or one and not the other, either
under its own 1985 Rules or under the Arbitration Rules of UNCI-
TRAL. 08 It will administer arbitrations anywhere in the world, al-
though about 80% take place in London. 0 Support services available
at London's International Arbitration Centre, 75 Cannon Street,
London EC4N 5BH, in the financial district, include courtrooms, con-
ference rooms, secretarial and clerical assistance, and telephone and
telex facilities." 0
CIARB is a critical ingredient in the functioning of the LCIA.
While it no longer manages the LCIA as one of its activities, its basic
function is to train arbitrators for service on some 38 different panels of
arbitrators, whose members are drawn from a variety of disciplines and
specialized fields."' Its membership is about 6,700, with one-third
104. Letter from K.R.K. Harding, CIARB Secretary, to author (Dec. 17, 1987).
The change in relationship has generally not been remarked, even with the removal of
the LCIA headquarters from Cannon Street to St. Mary Axe in December 1987.
CIARB, however, continues as a co-sponsor of the LCIA, and the relationship remains
functionally close. THE LONDON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION TRUST LIMITED, ARBI-
TRATION IN LONDON 5 (1983) [hereinafter ARBITRATION IN LONDON].
105. ARBITRATION IN LONDON, supra note 104, at 5.
106. Vigrass, Telephone Interview, supra note 102.
107. See supra notes 42, 78 and accompanying text (discussing the number of
cases that the ICC and AAA conduct).
108. LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, SERVICES FOR ARBITRA-
TION UNDER THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES.
109. Vigrass, Telephone Interview, supra note 102.
110. ARBITRATION IN LONDON, supra note 104, at 9-10. LCIA administrative
charges include an initial filing fee of £200 and thereafter a rate per hour specified
from time to time by the LCIA. On January 1, 1985, the hourly rate was £50. Arbitra-
tor fees are calculated as a function of time: from £300 to £1,250 per day for meetings
and hearings, and £60 to £250 per hour for other work on the arbitration. LCIA Rule
18.1 and LCIA SCHEDULE OF COSTS (effective Jan. 1, 1985). These rates were still in
effect as of October 1, 1988. Letter from B.W. Vigrass, LCIA Registrar, to author
(Oct. 3, 1988).
111. See Vigrass, The Training of Arbitrators at the Institute of Arbitrators, 4
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based overseas in some 85 different countries. Through basic and ad-
vanced examinations held twice a year, or arbitral experience validated
as equivalent, members are qualified for Associate or Fellowship grade
status."' Of the 6,700 members, 1,800 are Fellows.11' CIARB has
published the quarterly journals Arbitration since 1954 and Arbitration
International since 1985. Their headquarters is at the International Ar-
bitration Centre in Cannon Street. K.R.K. Harding is Secretary.
London's traditional popularity as a venue for international arbitra-
tion began to erode in the 1970s, with the trend accelerating in 1973
when the Court of Appeals in The Lysland ruled, in effect, that an
arbitrator had to submit to the courts a "special case" if there existed a
substantial and clear-cut point of law to be resolved.115 The special case
procedure, unknown in the Civil Law system and in the United States,
involved the arbitrator's finding the facts but leaving open the award to
await the court's decision on a point of law. The result was (a) a back-
log of hundreds of arbitrations and (b) the rejection of London for
Paris, New York, Geneva, Zurich, and elsewhere by those unwilling to
endure an arbitral process that had become merely a rehearsal for
court litigation."1 6
The London malaise was addressed, dramatically, by the Arbitration
Act 1979. It abolished the special case procedure and replaced it with a
rigidly controlled and limited procedure for appeal on points of law, but
only with leave of the High Court (a court of first instance).,n Discre-
tion to grant leave was then narrowed in "guidelines" issued by the
Y.B. Comm. ARB. 380, 381-82 (1979) [hereinafter Vigrass, The Training of Arbitra-
tors] (discussing the function of the CIARB).
112. Telex from K.R.K. Harding, CIARB Secretary, to author (Oct. 15, 1987)
[hereinafter Harding Telex].
113. See Vigrass, The Training of Arbitrators, supra note 111, at 382-85 (discuss-
ing the training and examination aspects of the CIARB).
114. Harding Telex, supra note 112.
115. Much has been written on the background to the Arbitration Act 1979. The
best and most authoritative is Kerr, Statutes: The Arbitration Act 1979, 43 MoD. L.
REV. 45, 45-49 (1980) [hereinafter Kerr, Statutes] (discussing the background of the
Arbitration Act 1979); see also Shenton & Toland, London as a Venue for Interna-
tional Arbitration: The Arbitration Act 1979, 12 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 643, 650
(1980) (pointing out that the special case procedure was causing international busi-
nesses to hold arbitrations elsewhere); Park, Judicial Supervision of Transnational
Commercial Arbitration: The English Arbitration Act of 1979, 21 HARV. INT'L L.
87, 97-107 (1980) (considering the effects of the Arbitration Act 1979 on English arbi-
tral practice).
116. See Kerr, Statutes, supra note 115, at 46-47 (noting the backlog resulting
from the special case procedure and parties' unwillingness to submit to arbitration over
which a court could have "the last word").
117. Id. at 49-50.
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House of Lords in The Nema (1981) and The Antaios (1984).118
More importantly for transnational arbitration, the 1979 Act permit-
ted the parties to contract out of even this limited a review by means of
an "exclusion agreement." Now parties to international contracts may,
unless they are all "domestic," adopt such a clause at any time, before
or after a dispute arises."l 9 Excepted are maritime, commodity, and in-
surance disputes, in which case the exclusion must follow commence-
ment of arbitration.1 20 Excepted from the exception are contracts in
which a choice of law other than England and Wales is expressed.1 21
The only ground for judicial review remaining is "misconduct" of arbi-
trators and arbitrations, that is, "infringements of the rules of natural
justice. 1 22
The exclusion agreement may be incorporated by reference. For this
purpose reference to the 1985 Rules of the LCIA (Article 16.8) or the
ICC Rules of Arbitration (Article 24.2) is sufficient. 23 Article 24.2 of
the ICC Rules, which is substantially the same as Article 16.8 of the
LCIA Rules, provides:
By submitting the dispute to arbitration by the International Chamber of Com-
merce, the parties shall be deemed to have undertaken to carry out the resulting
award without delay and to have waived their right to any form of appeal insofar
as such waiver can validly be made.
Notwithstanding the exclusion of judicial review, the English courts
play a procedurally supporting role in arbitration: by appointing or re-
118. Antaios Compania Naviera S.A. v. Salen Rederierna A.B. (The Antaios) 3
ALL E.R. 229 (1984); BTP Trioxide, Ltd. v. Pioneer Shipping, Ltd. (The Nema) 2
LLOYDS REP. 239 (1981). For criticism of the two decisions see Kerr, Commercial
Dispute Resolution: The Changing Scene, in LIBER AMICORUM FOR LORD WILBER-
FORCE 111, 125-26 (M. Bos and I. Brownlie eds. 1987) (stating that "[t]hey clearly
went much further than the draftsmen [of the 1979 Act] intended or dared"). Regard-
ing The Nema, see Berggren, Judicial Implementation of the United Kingdom's Arbi-
tration Act, 1979, 24 HARV. INT'L L.J. 103, 122-43 (1983) (noting that the decision of
the House of Lords regarding The Nema was the first attempt of the courts to establish
guidelines for the implementation of the Arbitration Act 1979).
119. ARBITRATION ACT 1979, § 3(1) (1979).
120. Id. § 4(1)(c)(i). For severe criticism of these provisions, see Smedresman,
supra note 100, at 329-31 (stating that, of the 1979 Act's provisions, these are "the
least satisfactory in policy and language").
121. ARBITRATION ACT 1979, § 4(1)(c)(ii).
122. See M. MUSTILL & S. BOYD, supra note 83, at 602-04 (including conscious
disregard of the law, for whatever motive, as such infringement). Arbitration Act 1950
§ 23(2) provides that the High Court may set aside an award when an arbitrator "has
misconducted himself or the proceedings." The statute itself does not define miscon-
duct. Cf. 2 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND § 622 (4th ed. 1973) (listing ten examples
of "misconduct"); Second Cumulative Supplement 1988, § 622 (listing examples).
123. See A. LOWENFELD, supra note 14, at 90-91 (noting cases that uphold exclu-
sion based on reference to institutional rules).
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placing an arbitrator, preventing the disposal of assets, and assuring
compliance with an arbitrator's orders.12" '
The 1985 Rules of the LCIA, replacing those of 1981, which in turn
replaced those of 1978, are designed to promote party autonomy and to
maximize the jurisdiction and powers of the arbitrators.'2" Most of
their provisions can be waived by agreement of the parties. There are
rebuttable presumptions in favor of London as the venue and a sole
arbitrator rather than a three-member panel.1 20 They permit the LCIA,
and the arbitrators themselves where appropriate, to deal severely with
dilatory tactics.12 Awards must be "reasoned" but are not subject to
LCIA review . 28
For those with the negotiating luxury of preferring one institution to
another, the pre-eminence of London as a venue, both historical and
contemporary, offers something of a dilemma: do the formulations and
usages of the past, so carefully confected and so expertly measured to
the needs of London by an arbitration bar and commercial judiciary of
outstanding quality, embody the world-view required for truly transna-
tional dispute resolution? Succinctly, is England's insularity as rhetori-
cal as it is geographical? The question must be put this way in assess-
ing the LCIA even though a number of its cases are heard abroad.
Philosophy is no respecter of national frontiers.
Tracking the fate of the Arbitration Act 1979 in the courts provides
an answer, albeit partial. At almost each juncture the courts have re-
sponded affirmatively to what is taken as the spirit of the 1979 Act. 20
Acceptability of the standard ICC and LCIA clauses on finality of
award as exclusion of judicial review is one example.130 Another is the
discretionary inclination announced by the Court of Appeal not to or-
der security for costs against a foreign claimant when the parties have
agreed to exclude resort to this device or adopted a comprehensive arbi-
124. J. STEYN, supra note 99, at 17-20.
125. See Hunter & Paulsson, A Commentary on the 1985 Rules of the London
Court of International Arbitration, 10 Y.B. CoMi. ARB. 167, 167-68 (1985) (discuss-
ing changes made by the 1985 Rules of the LCIA that give parties the greatest possible
freedom to agree upon the conduct of the proceedings, and, should the parties fail to
agree, giving the tribunal wide discretion to conduct the proceedings in the way it con-
siders most efficient and effective).
126. LCIA RULES arts. 3.2 and 7.1.
127. LCIA RULES art. 13.
128. LCIA RULES art. 16.1.
129. As expressed by one commentator, the text of the 1979 Act is less important
than the context of its application. Park, Arbitration in International Business, 39 Bus.
LAW. 1782, 1792 (1984).
130. See text accompanying and immediately following note 123, supra (discussing
the acceptability of standard ICC and LCIA clauses).
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tral regime, such as the ICC's, that clearly does not contemplate it. 81
The scope of this latter dispensation remains unclear, however, and
controversial.3 2
In evaluating the English cases and published commentaries since
1979, it is important to segregate the issues that can be excluded from
judicial review from those that cannot. Many of the criticisms directed
at the scope of judicial review on the merits, for instance, are simply
irrelevant in the presence of an exclusion agreement. Under the Nema
and Antaios guidelines a court may grant leave for appeal to resolve a
novel or potentially far-reaching point of law, especially with respect to
standard clauses. But neither the guidelines nor the opportunity "to en-
rich English law and promote uniformity" obtain when the parties have
agreed to exclude judicial review.1 3
The lure of London, and of the LCIA, for parties from Common
Law jurisdictions is evidently great. Legal tradition, common language,
and cultural heritage combine to enhance its otherwise favorable attrib-
utes. Civilians and others from non-Common Law jurisdictions, how-
ever, may suffer from a certain free-floating anxiety about a context
that at times may appear parochial or ethnocentric.13 4 The treatment
131. Bank Mellat v. Helsinki Techniki S.A., 3 ALL E.R. 428 (1983). But see K/S
A/S Bani and K/S A/S Havbulki v. Korea Shipbuilding and Engineering Corp., 2
LLOYD'S REP. 445 (1987) (allowing buyers' application for security for costs).
132. Compare Samuel, supra note 100, at 22-23 (favoring security for costs) with
Jarvin, supra note 100, at 60, 64-71 (generally opposing security for costs) and Craw-
ford & Feldman, supra note 100, at 237 (not taking a position but indicating that
security for costs could be a "disincentive" to the choice of London).
133. The quoted language is from Crawford & Feldman, supra note 100, at 236.
The authors regard review for this purpose as an infringement of party autonomy "per-
mitting the appropriation for a public purpose of an aspect of the parties' private dis-
pute." Samuel, supra note 100, at 33, concluded in 1988 that "English law is still
trying to untangle itself from the consequences of a history of tight court control." But
see Jaffe, The Judicial Trend Toward Finality of Commerical Arbitral Awards in
England, 24 TEX. INT'L L.J. 67, 77-86 (1989) (noting that the courts have returned to
a middle way between arbitral autonomy and legal certainty). All three commentaries
are referring to review on the merits, which by agreement the parties can exclude.
134. 2 J. WETrER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION PROcESS 243 (1979). See
generally Jarvin, supra note 100 (evaluating London as an international arbitration
site). Professor Lalive of Geneva has expressed the notion this way:
Some of you may recall that, a few years ago, in another London conference, I
observed with typical lack of tact that, for some of my English friends, the ideal
international arbitration seemed to be arbitration in London by parties repre-
sented by English counsel arguing before English arbitrators applying English
law and supervised by English judges! And a similar remark could doubtless be
made in my own country. While this may admittedly be a good solution in some
cases, I venture to think that, for most parties, it would hardly be a true and
satisfactory international arbitration.
Lalive, International Arbitration - Teaching and Research, in CONTEMPORARY PROB-
LEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 6, at 19. Cf. Kerr, supra note 7, at
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for this is at hand: exclusion of judicial review, adoption of institutional
rules, specification of foreign substantive law, and selection of arbitra-
tors sophisticated in the ways of genuinely international arbitration,
with which London abounds. Choosing London as a venue may call for
more thought and attention than choosing, say, among Paris, Stock-
holm or Zurich, but the compensating advantages are there to make it
well worth the additional effort. 3 '
VII. STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
Sweden, a place-name almost synonymous with neutrality, is now -
it is fair to say - the preferred third-country venue for arbitration of
East-West commercial disputes.13 6 And for transnational commercial
disputes in general, regardless of political context, Stockholm is re-
garded as fully competitive with Geneva, London, New York, Paris,
and Zurich."'
The leading center for institutional arbitration in Sweden is the Ar-
bitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC).2as
The SCC Institute will act as administrator or as appointing authority
only.' 39 It does not itself act as an arbitral tribunal, nor are awards
15-16 (stating that "[Our] system is our bulwark against corruption, arbitrariness, im-
proper conduct and - where necessary - sheer incompetence .... ).
135. A. LoWENrELD, supra note 14, at 91 (including footnote "x," describing a
leading example of review by the courts on the basis of the importance of the point of
law at issue).
136. The characterization of "preferred" is based upon the estimated number of
current East-West contracts containing SCC compromissory clauses as compared with
those specifying other third-country venues, principally Austria and Switzerland. Indic-
ative is the official - and unique - blessing given to Stockholm by the AAA, the
USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the China Council for the Promotion
of International Trade. See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text (discussing the
use of Sweden for East-West commercial arbitration).
137. This is necessarily a highly subjective judgment, but it is based on the author's
more than 35 years of experience in negotiating contracts with compromissory clauses.
It should be noted that the IXth [quadrennial] International Arbitration Congress of
the International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA) will be held in Stock-
holm in 1990. Previous congresses were held in Paris, Rotterdam, Venice, Moscow,
New Delhi, Mexico City, Hamburg, and New York. Sanders, Welcoming Address, in
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, CONGRESS SERIES No. 3
11 (1986).
138. STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN 5-6 (2d ed.
1984) [hereinafter ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN]. This work, the only full-length treat-
ment of the subject in English, was written principally by Dr. J. Gillis Wetter of the
Stockholm office of the New York law firm, White & Case; see also Wetter, Sweden
as the Location of International Arbitration Proceedings, in PRIVATE INVESTORS
ABROAD: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 223 (V. Cameron ed. 1977) (evaluating Sweden
as an arbitration forum). The address of the SCC is P.O. Box 16050, S-103 22
Stockholm.
139. RULES OF THE ARBITRATION INSTITUTE OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAIBER OF
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rendered by arbitrators subject to its approval, either as to substance or
as to procedure. The parties may specify that the applicable rules shall
be those of the SCC Institute, revised as of January 1, 1988, replacing
those of 1976.140 Or they may specify other rules instead, such as those
COMMERCE § 1 (effective Jan. 1, 1988) [hereinafter SCC RULES]. An English transla-
tion of the SCC Rules is published by the SCC in separate pamphlet form. It also
constitutes an appendix to the SCC pamphlet ARBITRATION UNDER THE RULES OF
ARBITRATION INSTITUTE OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE: AN INTRODUC-
TION (1988). The translation of the SCC Rules is reprinted in 2 INT'L ARB. REP. 882
(1987).
140. See Wetter, Institutional Arbitration in Sweden: A Guide to Arbitration
Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, ARE. J.,
June 1988, at 5 (describing briefly the 1988 Rules, with text annexed). The 1976 rules
may be found in Appendix 6 of ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN, supra note 138, at 211.
Among the changes made by the new SCC Rules are these:
(a) Elimination of the old rule 5 reference to the applicability of the Swedish law of
arbitration. The mandatory provisions of law apply in any event, but problems concern-
ing the non-mandatory provisions (gap-fillers or ius dispositivum) are removed, and
there is now no impediment to the use of Stockholm rules at some venue other than
Sweden. According to Ulf Franke, Secretary of the Stockholm Institute, extension of
the rules to non-Swedish arbitrations was a "strong reason" for the deletion. Telephone
interview with Ulf Franke, Secretary of Stockholm Institute (Apr. 12, 1988).
(b) Changes paralleling the following articles of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
(with SCC Rule equivalents in parentheses): 9 (disclosure by arbitrators of possibly
disqualifying circumstances, Sec. 6); 20 (amendments to claims and defenses, Sec. 19);
28 (continuance of proceedings in event of party default, Sec. 23); 30 (waiver of proce-
dural defects by absence of timely objection, Sec. 24); and 37 (issuance of additional
awards, Sec. 31). See Franke, SCC Arbitration Goes Further International, INT'L
ARB. REP., Mar. 1988, at 22, 22-24 (discussing the 1988 SCC Rules of Arbitration
and the differences between the old and new rules).
(c) Inclusion of a stricter standard on assessment of costs to the losing party, requiring
payment of all costs by the loser "unless the circumstances call for a different result"
(Sec. 29). Old rule 19 provided merely that the award would state "if and to what
extent" the loser would bear the victor's costs. As a matter of actual practice the costs,
which include legal fees, have usually been assessed in accordance with the stricter
standard anyway, by analogy to the Swedish Procedural Code of 1948. ARBITRATION
IN SWEDEN, supra note 138, at 135-36.
(d) Issuance of a scale for the calculation of compensation to the Institute and guide-
lines for the deposit of security for costs, including both compensation to the Institute
and fees for arbitrators. By combining both compensation and fees, and converting
Swedish kroner to United States dollars at 6.15 to 1.00, the approximate rate of ex-
change on December 30, 1988, the author calculates that the minimum and maximum
deposits for the indicated amounts in controversy (left-hand column) are now as
follows:
$ 100,000 $ 9,276 to $ 19,065
1,000,000 27,602 to 64,715
10,000,000 58,618 to 166,504
The foregoing contains components for Institute compensation as follows:
$ 100,000 $ 2,069
1,000,000 8,354
10,000,000 13,545
According to Franke, the components for arbitrators' fees (first table minima and max-
ima minus second table figures) should be reduced to one-third for purposes of compar-
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issued by UNCITRAL.' 4 In either case the SCC Institute will per-
form the necessary administrative functions.
The board of the SCC Institute is composed of three members and
three deputy members. The Chairman, since January 1987, has been
Judge Birgitta Blom, President of the Court of Appeal (Svea Region)
in Stockholm. By tradition the president of that tribunal is the highest
ranking jurist in Sweden. The Secretariat of the Institute is headed by
Ulf Franke, author and frequent speaker at international arbitration
conferences. The main function of the Secretariat is to assist in the
practical arrangements for arbitration, including information, secreta-
rial and other services, and premises (which can be the SCC building
in Stockholm). 42
The average international caseload of the SCC Institute is fifteen
cases per year. This does not include the approximately thirty interna-
tional cases since 1977 in which it has acted only as appointing
authority. 43
Official recognition of Stockholm's suitability in an East-West
framework came with an exchange of letters in January of 1977 among
the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the AAA, and the
SCC.'" Known as the US-USSR Optional Clause Agreement, the
three institutions approved for optional use a model arbitration clause
providing for arbitration to take place in Sweden under the Arbitration
Rules of UNCITRAL, with the SCC having the authority to appoint
the presiding arbitrator from a distinguished panel of eighteen mem-
bers approved in advance by the USSR Chamber and the AAA. 45
To mid-1988 there had been only two arbitrations actually conducted
pursuant to the Optional Clause Agreement. Both were settled, one in
ison with institutions, such as the ICC, whose tables list the ranges for sole arbitrator.
Telephone interview with Ulf Franke, Secretary of Stockholm Institute (Apr. 12,
1988).
141. A footnote to Sec. 1 of the SCC Rules states that "[tihe Arbitration Institute
of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce has adopted Conciliation Rules and Rules for
Procedures under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules."
142. Based on material supplied to the author by the SCC Institute.
143. Telex from Ulf Franke, Secretary of Stockholm Institute, to author (Sept. 1,
1988) [hereinafter Franke Telex].
144. See ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN, supra note 138, at 203 (containing letters at
Appendix 5 from the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry, AAA, and SCC
regarding the designation of Sweden for East-West commercial arbitration).
145. The US-USSR Optional Clause Agreement was the subject of numerous arti-
cles, for the most part descriptive only. From an analytical standpoint, in this author's
opinion, the most useful is Lebedev, The 1977 Optional Clause for Soviet American
Contracts, 27 AM. J. Cojip. L. 469, 469 (1979) (discussing general aspects of the op-
tional arbitration clause and specific problems connected with the application of UN-
CITRAL Rules within the sphere of national arbitration law).
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1982 and the other in 1984.46 Two of the negotiators of the agreement,
A.P. Belov of the Soviet Union and Gerald Aksen of the United States,
have said that extensive adoption of the optional clause - the exact
figures are unknown - has promoted settlement of differences and pre-
vented disputes from developing into formal procedures. This explains
the small number of actual arbitrations,1 7
Dramatic confirmation of Sweden's status in East-West affairs came
with the 1984 agreement between the SCC and the China Council for
the Promotion of International Trade. It has been estimated that there
are now "thousands" of contracts between Chinese and Western parties
that include an SCC Institute arbitration clause providing for applica-
tion of SCC Rules. Three cases (between United States and Chinese
parties) were pending as of September 1988.141
Key aspects of Swedish arbitration are the following:
- Sweden has ratified the New York Convention, so that awards are
widely enforceable elsewhere. 4
- The Swedish Arbitration Act of 1929 and the Swedish Foreign Ar-
bitration Agreements and Awards Act of 1929, both as amended, gov-
ern arbitrations in Sweden. 150 They contain few "mandatory" rules.
Most provisions are excludable and will apply only when parties have
omitted incorporating the rules, such as those of the SCC Institute or
UNCITRAL. An especially lucid analysis of the relationship between
the UNCITRAL rules and Swedish law has been made by Professor
Sergei N. Lebedev, another of the Soviet negotiators of the US-USSR
Optional Clause Agreement."'
- Swedish law does not mandate an award "with reasons" but both
the SCC Institute and the UNCITRAL rules do require a reasoned
award. 52
- Intervention by Swedish courts in the arbitral process is at a mini-
mum. Results of that process are overturned only if the procedure fol-
lowed by the arbitral tribunal is contrary to the parties' agreement or if
it otherwise fails to meet minimum standards of fairness. Errors in the
application of substantive law, which can be non-Swedish, or in the
146. Franke Telex, supra note 143.
147. Interview with Messrs. Belov and Aksen (AAA luncheon, New York, May 6,
1986).
148. Franke Telex, supra note 143.
149. New York Convention, supra note 18. Swedish ratification was deposited Jan.
28, 1972.
150. See ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN, supra note 138, at 172 (setting forth the texts
of the two laws).
151. Lebedev, supra note 145, at 472-75.
152. SCC RULES, supra note 139, at § 28; UNCITRAL RULES art. 32(3).
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determination of facts, are not grounds for setting aside arbitral
awards.18 3
The authoritative work on Swedish arbitration is Arbitration in Swe-
den, published by the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (276
pages).'" The introduction to this edition highlights one of the ques-
tions frequently raised about Swedish arbitration: which provisions of
Swedish law are mandatory and which are merely gap-fillers. Legisla-
tion is silent on the point. The first edition (1977) attempted to indicate
the mandatory provisions by italics. The attempt was abandoned for
the second edition because of the interpretive difficulty involved and
because of disagreement among the commentators."" 8 There may be
less to this problem than meets the eye. Very few of the provisions are
mandatory, in any event, and those that are, are thoroughly expectable
and "mainstream" in effect.1 57 The new SCC Rules, moreover, untie
SCC arbitration from Swedish non-mandatory law as a gap-filler, thus
permitting SCC arbitration outside Sweden, under non-Swedish arbi-
tral law.158
Selection of the SCC would appear in most cases to be the exercise
of a Hobson's choice, 59 the only viable alternative for an East-West, or
possibly North-South, transaction or relationship. 0°
VIII. SWITZERLAND
Switzerland is the quintessence of neutrality. So devoted is it to pre-
serving this posture that, in an excess of caution, it has not even joined
the United Nations. It does, however, enjoy "permanent observer" sta-
153. See ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN, supra note 138, at 144-56 (discussing the
grounds for reversal of an arbitral decision); Paulsson, The Role of Swedish Courts in
Transnational Commercial Arbitration, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 211, 226 (1981) (noting
that the arbitral tribunal's determination of all substantive issues is final). Awards may
be challenged only for procedural defects. Id.
154. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing ARBITRATION IN
SWEDEN).
155. ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN, supra note 138, at 6 n.3.
156. Id.
157. Lebedev, supra note 145, at 472-74; Bocksteigel, The Relevance of National
Arbitration Law for Arbitrations Under the UNCITRAL Rules, 1 J. INT'L Arm. 223,
233 (1984).
158. See supra note 140 (discussing the new SCC Rules and removal of referral to
non-mandatory provisions). Old rule 5 (of 1976), repealed in 1988, provided as follows:
"The Swedish law of arbitration shall apply with the additions and modifications stated
in these Rules." ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN, supra note 138, at 212.
159. Thomas Hobson (1544-1631), an English liveryman of Cambridge, reportedly
gave his customers the "choice" of the horse nearest the stable or none at all. RANDO?,1
HOUSE DICTIONARY (2d ed. unabridged 1987).
160. 2 J. WETrER, supra note 134, at 243.
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tus, is party to the International Court of Justice, and is headquarters
- in Geneva - for several specialized agencies of the United Nations.
At the same time, it has one of the most refined legal systems and
sophisticated cadre of lawyers in the world.16
For these reasons and many more, including its polyglot population
and perhaps even the quality of its hotels, Switzerland has become the
venue par excellence for third-country arbitration. 62
The vast majority of international cases are conducted in English.
Many are also held in French or in German, and some in Italian or in
Spanish.16 3 French, German, and Italian are the official languages of
the country. Authoritative estimates place the number of international
arbitrations conducted annually in Switzerland at a figure approaching
300.164 Awards rendered in Switzerland are readily enforceable in at
least 77 other countries under the New York Convention.
In recent years the popularity of Switzerland for arbitration has suf-
fered somewhat from what many regard as excessive judicial interven-
tion.6 5 Local cantonal courts have annulled arbitral awards and the
Federal Tribunal, the court of last resort, has overturned cantonal deci-
sions not to annul.' 66 This will now be changed under a sweeping re-
structuring and revision of Swiss arbitration law.
The new Swiss International Arbitration Law (SIAL) will apply
whenever the arbitration is international, that is, whenever at least one
of the parties does not have its domicile or habitual residence in Swit-
zerland.6 The effective date was fixed by the Federal Council (execu-
161. R. SCHLESINGER, H. BAADE, M. DAMASKA & P. HERZOG, COMPARATIVE
LAW 546 (5th ed. 1988).
162. R. DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 101 (1985).
163. Swiss ARBITRATION AssOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN SWIT-
ZERLAND 6 (2d ed. 1986).
164. Telex from Professor Pierre Lalive, President of Swiss Arbitration Associa-
tion, to author (Jan. 12, 1988) [hereinafter Lalive Telex].
165. Karrer, Switzerland's New Law is Modern, Liberal and Pragmatic, INT'L
ARB. REP., Jan. 1988, at 21, 23 (referring to Switzerland's reputation for judicial inter-
vention). See generally Blessing, The International Arbitration Law in Switzerland, 5
J. INT'L ARB., June, 1988, at 9, 12 (at 75 pages, excluding English translation of
SIAL, this was by far the most ambitious commentary in English to be published by
December 1988).
166. See Neyroud & Park, Predestination and Swiss Arbitration Law: Geneva's
Application of the Intercantonal Concordat, 2 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 11-23 (1983) (criti-
cizing cantonal and federal court interference with arbitral decisions).
167. See Karrer, supra note 165, at 21 (describing SIAL's application to "interna-
tional" arbitration). The Swiss Arbitration Association has prepared, in accordance
with past practice, a semi-official English translation. BULL. SwIss ARB. A. Oct. 1988,
at 185. This will eventually be published in all of the standard reference works on
international arbitration. An unofficial English translation previously prepared and
published is by Robert Briner, Pierre Karrer and Marc Blessing. Briner, Karrer &
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tive authority) at January 1, 1989.166 The final text had been approved
by the Swiss Parliament on December 18, 1987, and published in the
federal gazette on January 12, 1988.168
A singular - and salutary - departure from pre-1989 law is the
provision in SIAL that if neither of the parties has its domicile, its
habitual residence, or a business establishment in Switzerland, the par-
ties may, by express agreement, exclude all judicial review of the
award unless enforcement is sought in Switzerland. 7 0 A Zurich firm
Blessing, Final Text of the Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law,
Twelfth Chapter: International Arbitration, INT'L ARB. REP. Feb., 1988, Do. Sec. A
[hereinafter Briner Translation], reprinted in 13 Y.B. CoMM. ARB. 446 (1988)]. A
third translation is by Charles Poncet and Emmanuel Gaillard. Poncet & Gaillard,
Translation of Chapter 12 of the Swiss Statute on Private International Law, 27
I.L.M. 43 (1988) [hereinafter Poncet & Gaillard, Translation]. A fourth is essentially
by Adam Samuel. 4 ARB. INT'L 21 (1988). The Swiss Arbitration Association transla-
tion is based on the Briner-Karrer-Blessing and Samuel translations, with suggested
changes by Professor Clive Schmitthoff, Humphrey Lloyd, Michael Schneider and Pro-
fessor Claude Reymond. 3 Swiss BULLETIN, supra, at 184. For an expectably well-
focused description of SIAL by the President of the Swiss Arbitration Association, see
Lalive, The New Swiss Law on International Arbitration, 4 ARB. INT'L 2, 6 (1988)
[hereinafter Lalive, The New Swiss Law]. But see Gaillard, A Foreign View of the
New Swiss Law on International Arbitration, 4 ARB. INT'L 25, 25-27 (1988) (expres-
sing doubts about certain aspects of SIAL).
168. BULL. Swiss ARB. A., Dec. 1988, at 340.
169. See Karrer, supra note 165, at 21, 21 (noting the passage of SIAL); Legisla-
tive Update, INT'L ARB. REP., May 1988, at 17 (same); Lalive Telex, supra note 164
(same); see also BULL., Swiss ARB. A., Mar. 1988, at 1, 13-31 (containing reprints of
the full texts of SIAL in French, German, and Italian).
170. Swiss INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW art. 192 [hereinafter SIAL]. The
official French version, in BULL. Swiss ARB. A., supra note 169, and the semi-official
English translation, Swiss BULLETIN, supra note 167, are as follows:
Official French
1. Si les deux parties n'ont ni domicile, ni residence habituelle, ni 6tablissement
en Suisse, elles peuvent, par une d6claration expresse dans la convention
d'arbitrage ou un accord 6crit ult~rieur, exclure tout recours contre les sentences
du tribunal arbitral; elles peuvent aussi n'exclure le recours que pour Pun ou
'autre des motifs 6num6r~s i l'article 190, 2e alinea.
2. Lorsque les parties ont exclu tout recours contre les sentences et que celles-ci
doivent Etre ex~cut6es en Suisse, la convention de New York du 10 juin 1958
pour la reconnaissance et l'6xecution de sentences arbitrales 6trangares
s'applique par analogie.
Semi-Official English (Swiss ARB. A.)
1. Where none of the parties has its domicile, its habitual residence, or a busi-
ness establishment in Switzerland, they may, by an express statement in the arbi-
tration agreement or by a subsequent agreement in writing, exclude all setting
aside proceedings, or they may limit such proceedings to one or several of the
grounds listed in article 190, paragraph 2.
2. Where the parties have excluded all setting aside proceedings and where the
awards are to be enforced in Switzerland, the New York Convention of 10 June,
1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards shall ap-
ply by analogy.
The key phrase, "exclure tout recours contre les sentences du tribunal arbitral,"
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has already rendered the opinion that Article 24.2 of the ICC Rules
probably does not of itself constitute such an "express" agreement."'
Prudence would seem to require explicit reference to Swiss law.
The SIAL, in addition to permitting non-Swiss adversaries to ex-
clude judicial "appeal," provides that the arbitration agreement may be
made by telegram or telex;172 that it is "severable" from the main con-
tract for purposes of determining its validity;11  that it is valid if it
conforms either to the law chosen by the parties or to the law applica-
ble to the dispute or to Swiss law; 74 that the arbitrators themselves
shall rule on their own jurisdiction; 75 that the arbitral tribunal shall
apply the substantive law chosen by the parties, or in the absence of a
choice, the rules of law that have the "closest connection" with the
subject matter of the dispute - American lawyers will recognize this
as the "most significant relationship" test;76 and that the arbitral tri-
bunal shall apply the procedural rules chosen by the parties, or in the
absence of a choice, the rules determined by the tribunal "either di-
rectly, or by reference to a law or to arbitration rules. '7 The latter
provision was included by the Swiss parliament only late in 1987, elimi-
caused obvious difficulties for the translators. It was variously rendered as "waive fully
the action for annulment against the awards" (Briner-Karrer-Blessing); "waive their
right to challenge an arbitral award before the Swiss courts" (Poncet-Gaillard); "ex-
clude all right to bring proceedings to set aside the arbitral award" (Samuel); and
"exclude all setting aside proceedings" (Swiss Arbitration Association). The rather
elaborate and even awkward circumlocutions for "tout recours" are due no doubt to the
desire to make clear that, in accordance with SIAL article 192(2), there is in fact non-
waivable "recourse" (in the broad and non-juridical English sense) in the event judicial
enforcement of the award is sought in Switzerland. Poudret, Les recours au Tribunal
ftdral suisse en matihre d'arbitrage interne et international, BULL. Swiss ARB. A.,
Mar. 1988, at 33, 50. Judicial review can thus be fully (or partially) excluded in Swit-
zerland qua situs of arbitration, but not as to situs of execution. This is merely "filling
the gap" to match the conditions in any other country party to the New York Conven-
tion. Lalive, The New Swiss Law, supra note 167, at 20. One lacuna not filled results
from the article 192(2) reference only to "all" right when compared with the article
192(1) additional faculty of excluding only some of the grounds of review. It seems
likely that a Swiss court would, in spite of the literal terms of article 192(2), apply the
New York Convention criteria pro tanto to a case of partial exclusion. Gaillard, supra
note 167, at 31; Blessing, supra note 165, at 76. Procedures for judicial review under
the Concordat (see text accompanying notes 165-66, supra and notes 184, 189-191,
infra) are described in Neyroud & Park, supra note 166, at 5-23.
171. See Karrer, supra note 165, at 24 n.8 (noting that "Switzerland does not fol-
low the Belgian model reading an exclusion agreement into all international arbitra-
tions"); Lalive, The New Swiss Law, supra note 167, at 19 (same); see text following
note 123 supra (quoting the wording of ICC RULES, art. 24.2).
172. SIAL, supra note 170, art. 178(1).
173. Id. art. 178(3).
174. Id. art. 178(2).
175. Id. art. 186(1).
176. Id. art. 187(1).
177. Id. arts. 182(1) and 182(2).
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nating the draft bill's reference to cantonal procedural law as subsidia-
rily applicable by analogy.117  The arbitral tribunal may render an
award ex aequo et bono if the parties have so agreed.1 79 That is, with
party concurrence, it may decide on the basis of general principles of
justice, without reference to specific rules of law. Awards must be "rea-
soned" but, according to a prominent Swiss attorney, the parties may
agree otherwise.""
An innovation meriting special attention is the SIAL provision that if
a state or state-controlled entity is a party to arbitration, it cannot rely
on its own law to contest arbitrability or its own capacity to be party to
an arbitration. 81 Bad faith could estop the private party from relying
on this, 82 but the provision, unique to Switzerland, should deter state
parties from interposing some of the more egregious preliminary objec-
tions of the recent past. 8 3
The SIAL's recognition of party autonomy for international cases is
in striking contrast to the underlying arbitral regime of the Concordat
(see below), fully two-thirds of whose 46 articles are designated as
"mandatory."'" The SIAL is mostly ius dispositivum. It fills the gaps
the parties could have filled themselves.
The SIAL is actually only one part - Chapter 12 - of a massive
new codification known as the Federal Law on Private International
Law (Conflict of Laws).185 It was Chapter 11 before the last-minute
renumbering of chapters and articles. The full conflicts statute covers
not only international arbitration but jurisdiction, recognition and en-
forcement of foreign judgments, and choice of law (for torts, contracts,
178. See New Swiss Arbitration Law Final Following Changes, INT'L ARB. REP.,
Oct. 1987, at 702, 702 (discussing the modified provision).
179. SIAL, supra note 170, art. 187(2).
180. Id. arts. 189(1), 189(2). Blessing, supra note 165, at 65, 66.
181. SIAL, supra note 170, art. 177(2).
182. Lalive, The New Swiss Law, supra note 167, at 9-10.
183. Lalive, Some Threats, supra note 10, at 30-33.
184. Reymond, The New Swiss Uniform Arbitration Act and International Com-
mercial Arbitration, 7 GA. J. INT'L & CoMip. L. 85, 87 (1977). The text of the semi-
official Swiss Arbitration Association English translation of the Concordat may be
found in 2 H. SMIT & V. PECHOTA, supra note 30, at 2543; see also Briner, Switzer-
land, in INT'L HANDBOOK COMM. ARB. 1, 2 (1988) [hereinafter Briner] (describing
Swiss arbitral procedure).
185. See Poncet & Gaillard, Translation, supra note 167, at 37 (including an "in-
troductory note" to their English translation of SIAL); see also Samuel, The New
Swiss Private International Law Act, 37 INT'L & Cobifp. L.Q. 681, 689-92 (1988) (ex-
amining Chapter 12 of SIAL). A provision of importance to international arbitration in
the new Federal Law on Private International Law that is not included in Chapter 12
(articles 176-194) is article 7, which provides that a Swiss court shall decline jurisdic-
tion of a matter covered by a valid arbitration agreement. Swtss ARB. A., Oct. 1988, at
195 (English translation).
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property, succession, domestic relations, and companies). 18 The com-
prehensive effort began officially with a committee of experts in
1973.187 One commentator, now a member of the International Law
Commission, has said that "rarely has a piece of national legislation
been drafted with the care and skill invested" in the preparation of the
new conflicts statute.188
Until SIAL went into effect, Swiss arbitration was governed in the
main by the Intercantonal Arbitration Convention of 1969 (Concor-
dat), which contains a uniform text of cantonal arbitration law adopted
by 25 of Switzerland's 26 cantons, including Geneva, Basel, Bern,
Vaud (Lausanne), Ticino (Lugano) and, since 1985, Zurich. 180 The
Concordat is not applicable in one of the cantons representing about
4.6 % of the population: Lucerne, whose own non-unified rules on arbi-
tration are set forth in its cantonal code of civil procedure. 90 The Con-
cordat and the one non-unified cantonal code will apply even now if (a)
the arbitration is not international or (b) the parties have agreed to
exclude SIAL.Y9'
Final adoption of SIAL involved problems not often encountered
elsewhere. It is only one segment of a much grander project of codifica-
tion. The legislation must be redacted with meticulous exactitude in the
three official languages of the country. (Language breakdown of the
population is 65% German, 18% French and 12% Italian.)'9 2 And
during the 90 days following publication of a law, 50,000 voters or
eight cantons can demand a referendum; in such event a national ma-
jority of voters must approve.9's For SIAL the 90-day period, after
186. See McCaffrey, The Swiss Draft Conflicts Law, 28 AM. J. CoMp. L. 235, 241
(1980) (discussing the provisions of the proposed Swiss Federal Law on Private Inter-
national Law).
187. Id. at 239-40.
188. Id. at 284.
189. See Briner, supra note 184, at 2 (listing 24 cantons that have accepted the
uniform text of cantonal arbitration); BULL. Swiss ARB. A., Dec. 1988, at 340 (listing
the canton of Thurgau).
190. Id. at 2. The percentage of population represented by the non-unified canton
of Lucerne was calculated from the cantonal population figures set forth in 17 ENC.
BRIT. (MACRO) 874 (1976). Arbitration publications available in the United States
during late 1988 listed the number of non-unified cantons as four, including (in addi-
tion to Lucerne) Aargau, Glarus, and Thurgau. According to the Swiss Arbitration
Association, however, Aargau and Glarus adopted the Concordat effective January 1,
1988 and May 3, 1987, respectively, and Thurgau approved the Concordat on October
30, 1988. BULL. Swiss ARB. A., Mar. 1988, at 32; BULL. Swiss ARB. A., June 1988, at
123; BULL. Swiss ARB. A., Dec. 1988, at 340.
191. SIAL, supra note 170, arts. 176(1) and 176(2).
192. UNITED STATES CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1988 WORLD FAcTBooK
227 (1988).
193. REDDEN, 4 MOD. LEG. SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA 282-83 (1984). This is the so-
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brief tolling for late publication of the Italian language version, expired
on May 4, 1988.11
Switzerland has no national arbitration institution of its own. Arbi-
trations in Switzerland may be conducted by the parties under (a) ad
hoc rules established by the parties or issued by the arbitrators; (b)
pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules; (c) by the ICC Court of Arbitra-
tion in accordance with its own rules; or (d) in accordance with proce-
dures prescribed by cantonal chambers of commerce. Most prominent
in the latter category is the Zurich Chamber of Commerce, which has
been involved in administering arbitrations since 1911 (Rules of 1985
and "International" Rules of 1989).115 Others are the Geneva Cham-
ber of Commerce and Industry (Directives of 1980);9o and the Cham-
bers of Commerce of Basel (Rules of 1981), Bern (Rules of 1969), and
Ticino (Lugano) (Rules of 1982).97
Switzerland is thus a microcosm of the world institutional scene. Just
about any combination of rules, venue and institutions is possible. With
a new law on international arbitration that was carefully crafted to op-
timize party autonomy and to attract increased arbitration business to
Switzerland, it appears almost certain that Switzerland will retain its
ranking as the jurisdiction of preference for neutral-country arbi-
tration.
The Swiss Arbitration Association provides information and coordi-
nates public relations."98
called "optional referendum." One supposedly current compilation of constitutions and
one supposedly current digest of foreign law misstate these requirements as 30,000
voters. The 50,000 figure from Redden in the text is correct. Letter from Professor
Lalive, President of the Swiss Arbitration Association, to author (Dec. 4, 1987).
194. See Legislative Update, supra, note 169 at 17 (discussing that the deadline
passed, and no further changes may be made); BuLL Swiss ARB. A., Dec. 1988, at
340.
195. Blessing, The Zurich Mini-Trial Procedure, J. IWN'L An., Mar. 1985, at 67
(noting that the Zurich Chamber of Commerce has existed since 1911); 2 INT'L Coi.eri.
ARB. (Schmitthoff ed. 1986) Doc. IV.B(k) 1.1; IN-'L ARB. REP., Nov. 1988, Doc. B
(setting forth the International Arbitration Rules effective Jan. 1, 1989).
196. See J. IN'L ARB., Apr. 1984, at 73, 77 (setting forth the Directives of the
Geneva Chamber of Commerce and Industry of 1980).
197. 2 Irr'L Cothi. ARB., supra note 195, Does. IV.B (k/1.1) (Basel); IV.B (k/
2.1) (Berne); and IV.B (k/3.1) (Ticino). Swiss chambers of commerce generally charge
a fee for initiating arbitration and permit the arbitrators to charge "according to their
efforts." There is no administrative fee as such. Briner, supra note 184, at 16. In Zu-
rich, the initiating fee can vary between 100 and 500 Swiss Francs. Id. Arbitrator fees
usually correspond to the basic fee schedules for lawyers set by the canton. Id. Zurich
Rules 39 and Explanations and Directions 12, in 2 INT'L Comsu. ARB., supra note 195,
Doc. IV. B(k) 1.1.
198. For possible use of the Swiss Arbitration Association as a model for an inter-
national informational agency, see infra note 258. The address of the Swiss Arbitration
Association is P.O. Box 4182, CH-4002 Basel.
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IX. ICSID
The World Bank-sponsored International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) in Washington, D.C., is the most innova-
tive and at the same time the most widely "recognized" of all transna-
tional arbitral institutions. The multilateral treaty creating it has now
been accepted by 89 countries, with another eight that have signed but
not yet ratified it.""9
All regions of the world, as well as the main forms of economic activ-
ity, are represented. Notable "absentees" are Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, Canada, China, India, Mexico, Poland, and Spain.200 It is un-
derstood that acceptance is now under active consideration in Austra-
lia, China, and Poland.20'
Unlike other arbitral institutions, ICSID's jurisdiction is limited to
only one kind of case: "investment" disputes between a state and a na-
tional of another state.20 2 Thus excluded are disputes between govern-
ments, disputes wholly between private parties, and disputes between a
state and one of its own nationals, except in the case of a locally organ-
199. Scoreboard of Adherence to Transnational Arbitration Treaties (as of Janu-
ary 1, 1989), NEWS AND NOTES FROM THE INSTITUTE FOR TRANSNATIONAL ARBITRA-
TION (Annex to this article). The seat of ICSID is at the headquarters of the World
Bank, 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20433.
200. Id.
201. Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department Review of Developments in
International Trade Law, Bicentennial International Trade Law Conference in Can-
berra, Nov. 4-6, 1988, at 17 (Australia); see Speech of ICSID Secretary-General
Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, ICSID and the Italian Arbitration Association, 1 (Oct. 20,
1988) (referring to China and Poland) (unpublished) (on file with The American Uni-
versity Journal of International Law & Policy).
202. ICSID Convention, supra note 24, art. 25(1). Arbitration of disputes involving
a government or government-controlled entity present special problems, such as arbi-
trability, sovereign immunity from jurisdiction, sovereign prerogatives, applicable law,
effect of "stabilization clauses," scope of force majeure attributable to the state, and
enforceability (including attachment and execution). See generally CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 6, at 241-373 (containing arti-
cles by Cahier, Herrmann, Carver, Simmonds, Cremades, Lalive, Ball, Delaume, Fox,
Melis, Saleh, Coulson, Bernini, and Van den Berg); G. DELAUME, supra note 14, at
351-97 (discussing the elements of arbitrating state contract disputes); Delaume, State
Contracts and Transnational Arbitration, 75 Am. J. INT'L L. 784, 810 (1981) (noting
the imprecision of rules governing this area); Delaume, ICSID Arbitration and the
Courts, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 784, 802-03 (1983) (concluding that the theoretical prob-
lem of sovereign immunity has lost a great deal of its practical significance in view of
actual experience). The special problems can be practical as well as legal. Lalive,
Arbitration with Foreign States or State-Controlled Entities 6-7 (speech presented at
the Annual Symposium of The Southwestern Legal Foundation's International and
Comparative Law Center, June 23, 1988) (to be published in PRIVATE INVESTORS
ABROAD: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS (1988)). K.-H. BOCKSTIEGEL, ARBITRATION AND
STATE ENTERPRISES 21-23 (1984). For a Swiss attempt to deal with some of these
problems, see text accompanying notes 181-183 supra.
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ized entity when, because of its foreign control, the host state has
agreed to treat it as a national of another state. "Investment" is not
defined in the treaty but has been broadly construed in ICSID practice:
it includes not only traditional contributions of capital but also service
contracts and transfers of technology. 0 3
The full name of the ICSID Convention is the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States. It was opened for signature in 1965, in Washington,
D.C., and is sometimes also known as the Washington Convention. The
preamble to the ICSID Convention places the arbitration and concilia-
tion services of ICSID in a broader context of promoting private inter-
national investment for purposes of economic development. 20"
For the 20-plus years of ICSID's existence the total number of cases
submitted to it is 25 (including two for conciliation). 20 5 Almost half
have led to amicable settlement or were discontinued. Two awards have
been annulled by ad hoc committees of ICSID acting under Article 52
of the Convention (see below). Maximum caseload during the twelve
months ending June 30, 1988 was 11. 201 Although the total number of
cases registered by ICSID is small in comparison with other arbitral
institutions, experts estimate that ICSID arbitration clauses have now
been included in more than a thousand contracts involving billions of
dollars in foreign investment. 07
Notable features of ICSID arbitration are these:
203. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 6, at 23, 26 [hereinafter Delaume, ICSID Arbitra-
tion]. The literature on ICSID is extensive and is listed in Document ICSID/13
(1985). Because of their authors' positions with the World Bank over the years, articles
by Aron Broches, Georges R. Delaume, Heribert Golsong, and Ibrahim F.I. Shihata
may be taken as semi-official. A recent article of outstanding quality and utility, pub-
lished after the ICSID bibliography, is Broches, Awards Rendered Pursuant to the
ICSID Convention: Binding Force, Finality, Recognition, Enforcement, Execution, 2
ICSID REV. - FILJ 287 (1987); see also Shihata, The Settlement of Disputes Re-
garding Foreign Investment: The Role of the World Bank, with Particular Reference
to ICSID and MIGA, I Am. U.J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 97 (1986) (describing the role of
ICSID and MIGA); Broches, The Experience of the International Centre for Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes, in AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTER-
NATIONAL INVESTMENT DIsPuTEs: AVOIDANCE AND SETTLEMENT 75 (S. Rubin & R.
Nelson eds. 1985) (same); see also Sutherland, The World Bank Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes, 28 INT'L & Cohip. L.Q. 367, 368-70 (1979) (offer-
ing an earlier treatment of special merit).
204. ICSID Convention, supra note 24, at preamble.
205. ICSID 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1988).
206. Id.
207. Pirrwitz, Annulment of Arbitral Awards under Article 52 of the Washington
Convention on the Settlement of Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, 23 TEX. INTL L.J. 73, 75 (1988).
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1. By acceptance of the Convention a state does not automatically
consent to ICSID arbitration.08 Consent of a member state may be
granted in advance by legislation, in a separate agreement between
states, or in an agreement with the investor (such as a concession, eco-
nomic development, joint venture, or service agreement). 09 Once con-
sent is given by both parties it may not be withdrawn unilaterally.21 0
2. ICSID awards, if not annulled internally, are final in and of them-
selves. They are not subject to judicial review in any member state.211
By treaty an ICSID award is considered a final judgment in every such
state, a treatment that was original when conceived and that is still
unique. Not even the doctrine of sovereign immunity is a defense to
enforcement against a state, although actual execution still depends on
the provisions of local law in this regard.21
3. Consent to ICSID arbitration excludes all other remedies, 10 in-
cluding diplomatic protection (a species of Calvo Clause),214 except
that (a) informal diplomatic exchanges to facilitate settlement are per-
mitted;215 (b) a state may require exhaustion of local remedies as a
condition to its consent; 216 and (c) the ICSID Arbitration Rules permit
parties to stipulate in the agreement recording their consent that resort
may be had to national courts for provisional measures such as
attachment.217
4. The parties have unlimited freedom to establish the rules of law to
be applied, but in the absence of such agreement the ICSID arbitrators
are to apply the law of the state party to the dispute (including its
conflict of laws rules) and "such rules of international law as may be
applicable."21 The latter half of this formulation has led to much theo-
retical dispute. One view, set forth in the most authoritative work on
the ICSID Convention, written by the then General Counsel of the
World Bank and principal draftsman of the Convention, is this:
My submission as to the relationship between the law of the host State and
international law in the second sentence of 42(1) is as follows. The Tribunal will
208. ICSID Convention, supra note 24, art. 25(1).
209. G. DELAUME, supra note 14, at 360.
210. ICSID Convention, supra note 24, art. 25(1).
211. Id. arts. 53(1), 54(1).
212. Id. arts. 54(3), 55.
213. Id. art. 26.
214. Id. art. 27(1). As to the Calvo Clause, see L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0.
SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1064-68 (2d
ed. 1987).
215. ICSID Convention, supra note 24, art. 27(2).
216. Id. art. 26.
217. ICSID RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS 39(5).
218. ICS1D Convention, supra note 24, art. 42(1).
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first look at the law of the host State and that law will in the first instance be
applied to the merits of the dispute. Then the result will be tested against inter-
national law. That process will not involve the confirmation or denial of the va-
lidity of the host State's law, but may result in not applying it where that law, or
action taken under that law, violates international law. In that sense, as I sug-
gested earlier, international law is hierarchically superior to national law under
Article 42(l).219
This view appears to have been accepted. See paragraphs 69 and 70 of
Klbckner v. Cameroon, Decision of Ad Hoc Committee (1985).10
Organs of ICSID are the Administrative Council, consisting of one
representative from each member (usually its designee as World Bank
governor), and the Secretariat.221 The Secretary-General is the princi-
pal officer of ICSID.122 Incumbent Secretary-General is Ibrahim F.I.
Shihata, Vice President and General Counsel of the World Bank, with
LL.B. and LL.M. degrees from Cairo University and an S.J.D. from
Harvard Law School.223 Senior Counsel to ICSID for more than 20
years was Georges R. Delaume, author of a widely cited multi-volume
treatise on transnational law22 4 and of innumerable articles on invest-
ment law.225 Present Senior Counsel for ICSID is Antonio R. Parra.20
The ICSID Convention and the ICSID Arbitration Rules grant
broad autonomy to the parties and the arbitrators to determine their
own procedures. Only a few of their procedural provisions are
mandatory, and these are mostly designed to prevent frustration of the
arbitral process (e.g., there must be an uneven number of arbitra-
tors).227 When arbitrators are appointed by ICSID rather than the par-
ties they are drawn from an approved ICSID panel of arbitrators,
which, in addition to professional and moral qualifications, must reflect
the principal legal systems and main forms of economic activity in the
219. Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States, 136 RECUEIL DES CouRs 331, 392 (1972-11).
220. Klickner v. Cameroon, Decision of Ad Hoc Committee, 1 ICSID REv. -
FILJ 89, 112 (1986) (stating that principles of international law have a dual role in
this respect: "complementary," and "corrective" if a state's law does not conform to
international law).
221. ICSID Convention, supra note 24, arts. 3 and 4.
222. Id. art. 11.
223. Based on biographical material supplied to the author by the World Bank.
224. G. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS (1977) (with supplements). This is
not to be confused with the single-volume work cited in note 14 supra.
225. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (discussing Doe. ICSID/13 and
other pertinent materials).
226. Based on information supplied to the author by the World Bank.
227. See Delaume, ICSID Arbitration, supra note 203, at 33 (discussing the arbi-
tral process of ICSID).
1989)
AM U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
world.2 28 The venue of ICSID proceedings is legally irrelevant but, in
practice, it has been divided about equally between Washington, D.C.
and European cities.2 9 Awards must be "reasoned.
2 °3 0
To the approval of some, the disapproval of others and the consterna-
tion of many, two awards rendered by ICSID arbitral tribunals have
been annulled by internal ICSID ad hoc committees under Article 52
of the Convention.2 31 Applications for two more annulments were filed
in March and July 1988. The latter was in a case whose "final" award
had been annulled once already, thus involving the parties in a fourth
proceeding on the same set of facts. 2  Grounds for annulment are both
narrow and serious. 33 In the two cases the ad hoc committees con-
228. ICSID Convention, supra note 24, arts. 14(1), 14(2). Arbitrators receive a flat
fee for each day of hearings or related work and a per diem allowance for living ex-
penses away from home. ICSID ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL REGULATIONS,
14(1), reprinted in ICSID BASIC DOCUMENTS, Doc. ICSID/15 at 41 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL REGULATIONS]. The current amounts are 600
special drawing rights (SDRs) and $115, respectively (although the latter is higher for
some locations such as Geneva, London, New York, Paris, Stockholm, and Zurich at
$170, and Washington, D.C. at $150; and an alternative "mixed rate" is available
under which the arbitrator claims 50% of the per diem plus actual hotel room cost).
ICSID Schedule of Costs, January 1985 (arbitrator fees); ICSID announcement, Sept.
15, 1988 (per diem rates); ICSID Guidelines for Reimbursement of Travel and Subsis-
tence Expenses (undated) (full and mixed per diem rate procedures). An SDR is an
International Monetary Fund unit of measure that varies daily, based on weighted ex-
change rates for the U.S. dollar, Deutsche mark, French franc, Japanese yen, and
pound sterling. Between 1984 and 1987, it oscillated in U.S. dollar equivalents between
$.98 and $1.42. In July 1988 it was $1.37. See monthly IMF, International Financial
Statistics, Introduction and Table A of Exchange Rates. It is ICSID's practice to re-
quest, from time to time, cover for estimated expenditures. ADMINISTRATIVE AND FI-
NANCIAL REGULATIONS, supra, 14(3)(a). It is often said that ICSID's charges are less
than other institutions because it is subsidized by the World Bank. Delaume, ICSID
Arbitration, supra note 203, at 23. This, of course, does not take into account the
problem of annulment. See infra notes 231-238 and accompanying text (discussing
annulment).
229. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration, supra note 203, at 33.
230. ICSID Convention, supra note 24, art. 48(3).
231. ICSID, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1986) [hereinafter ICSID, 1986 ANNUAL
REPORT]. Kldckner v. Cameroon, Decision of Ad Hoc Committee, 1 ICSID REV -
FILJ 89, 112 (1986); Amco Asia v. Indonesia, I INT'L ARB. REP. 649 (1986), re-
printed in 25 I.L.M. 1439, 1439 (1986).
232. Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Repub. of Guinea (regis-
tered March 28, 1988). ICSID 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1988). Kl6ckner v. Came-
roon (registered July 1, 1988). NEWS FROM ICSID, July 1, 1988, at 8.
233. ICSID Convention, supra, note 24, art. 52(1) provides:
Either party may request annulment of the award by an application in writing
addressed to the Secretary-General on one or more of the following grounds:
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted;
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers;
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal;
(d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of proce-
dure; or
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cluded that the arbitrators had exceeded their powers by failing to ap-
ply the proper law, and had failed to state sufficient reasons to justify
their legal conclusions.3 4 The neutral presidents of the two committees
and the two tribunals are household names in transnational arbitration:
Professor Pierre Lalive of Geneva annulling Dr. Eduardo Jim~nez de
Ar~chaga of Montevideo (Klbckner v. Cameroon in 1985) and Profes-
sor Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern of Vienna annulling Professor Berthold
Goldman of Paris (Amco Asia v. Indonesia in 1986). The Secretary-
General of ICSID, who has not commented on the merits of the annul-
ments, has expressed the hope that recourse to annulment proceedings
will remain, as originally conceived, a narrow exception to the finality
of ICSID awards.2 35 Both cases were re-submitted and a second award
was rendered by a different panel in Klbckner in January 1988.230
Then the second award became the object of an application for annul-
ment.237 In Amco, a different panel, chaired by Professor Rosalyn Hig-
gins of London, rendered a decision on jurisdiction in May 1988.238
It borders on axiom to observe that ICSID arbitration is preferable
to any other when its jurisdictional requirements can be met. Enforce-
ability of awards under the ICSID Convention, World Bank resources
and subsidized costs to the parties, and involvement of ICSID's highly
trained and dedicated staff (some of it on loan from the World Bank)
(e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.
Id.
234. Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia, Decision of Ad Hoe Committee, 1 INT'L ARB.
REP. 649, 674 (1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1439 (1986); Klickner v. Cameroon,
Decision of Ad Hoc Committee, 1 ICSID REv. - FIL 89, 93 (1985).
235. ICSID, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 231, at 4. He has also said that "if
parties dissatisfied with awards regularly seek annulment such a practice may put in
doubt the features which make ICSID arbitration an attractive means of settling in-
vestment disputes." ICSID, Report of the Secretary-General to the Administrative
Council Sept. 27-29 (Berlin), at 3 (1988). For similar comment by a leading arbitra-
tion practitioner, see Craig, The Uses and Abuses of Appeal from International Arbi-
tration Awards, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD, supra note 41, at §§ 14.49-14.56
(stating that appeals should not be overused); Redfern, ICSID - Losing Its Appeal?, 3
ARB. INT'L 98, 118 (1987) (same); Feldman, The Annulment Proceeding and the Fi-
nality of ICSID Arbitral Awards, 2 ICSID REV. - FILJ 85 (1987) (stating that the
over-use of appeal is contrary to "the trend in international arbitration law to recognize
the finality of arbitral awards . . . ."); Pirrwitz, supra note 207 at 114-16 (declaring
that the benefits of ICSID arbitration outweigh any criticisms with regard to awards
and procedural safeguards).
236. As yet unpublished, K15ckner v. Cameroon (Resubmitted case), Award (Janu-
ary 26, 1988). ICSID 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1988).
237. Kl6ckner v. Cameroon, (registered July 1, 1988, NEWS FROM ICSID, July 1,
1988, at 8).
238. See Amco Asia v. Indonesia, (Resubmitted case), Decision on Jurisdiction,
INT'L APB. REP., June 1988, at Al, A26, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1281, 1281 (1988)
(ruling that the Tribunal continues to have jurisdiction ratione personae over the now
dissolved Amco Asia).
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assure a level of efficacy unequaled elsewhere. Potential abuse of the
internal annulment procedure, however, requires a caveat. The signs
are disquieting but the returns are not yet in. The ad hoc committees in
the third and fourth annulment proceedings have an opportunity to
clarify matters, 239 but amendment of the ICSID Rules may be the only
solution., 0
ICSID also administers the so-called Additional Facility for disputes
involving a state and a national of another state that are not covered by
the Convention.241 Awards in such cases are enforceable only under na-
tional law, not under the Convention. A number of bilateral investment
treaties contemplate possible recourse to the Additional Facility. 2
239. See supra note 232 (referring to the third and fourth annulment proceedings).
The committee in MINE is composed of Professor Sompong Sucharitkul of Thailand,
President; Judge K6ba MBaye of Senegal; and Aron Broches of the Netherlands, the
former Vice President and General Counsel of the World Bank and former Secretary-
General of ICSID. 5 NEWS FROM ICSID 9 (Summer 1988). The second committee in
Kl6ckner is composed of Professor Sucharitkul, President; Judge MBaye; and Professor
Andrea Giardina of Italy. Id. at 8. Professor Sucharitkul, who has served as Thailand's
ambassador to some 10 countries over the past 20 years, is a Barrister-at-Law of the
Middle Temple in London and holds the following degrees: B.A., M.A. and D. Phil.,
Oxford; Docteur en Droit, Paris; and LL.M., Harvard. He was a member of the Inter-
national Law Commission for 10 years and has been visiting professor or lecturer at
law schools throughout the world. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, DIREC-
TORY OF LAW TEACHERS, 1987-88 773 (1987); biographical material supplied to the
author by the World Bank.
240. The possibility of this was suggested by Secretary-General Shihata in ICSID
1988 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1988). Redfern, supra note 235, at 118, suggests amending
the ICSID Convention, but the article 66(1) requirement of unanimity would seem to
make this an unrealistic proposition, especially for a treaty with 89 parties. Amend-
ment of the ICSID Rules, however, requires only a two-thirds majority vote of the
Administrative Council (composed of one member from each contracting state). ICSID
Convention, supra note 24, arts. 4(l), 6(l). The efficacy of proceeding by rule, how-
ever, has been questioned, and with obvious reason. Gaillard, Some Notes on the
Drafting of ICSID Arbitration Clauses, 3 ICSID REV. - FILJ 136, 142-143 (1988)
(how can changed wording "prevail over the text of the Convention to prevent a full
application of Article 52?"). Any dispute about the propriety of proceeding by way of
Rules amendment would be resolved by the International Court of Justice. ICSID Con-
vention, supra note 24, art. 64. Yet another possibility would be for parties to waive
resort to annulment proceedings, or at least to a second round of annulment proceed-
ings, at the time of granting consent to ICSID arbitration. The philosophy of party
autonomy embodied in the ICSID Convention would appear sufficiently strong to over-
come any argument that article 52 is jus cogens.
241. ICSID Additional Facility for the Administration of Conciliation, Arbitration
and Fact-Finding Proceedings, Doc. ICSID/ 1I/Rev. I (1986); see Broches, The 'Addi-
tional Facility' of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (IC-
SID), 4 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 373, 373-79 (1979) (discussing the additional facility); Cf.
Golsong, A Guide to Procedural Issues in International Arbitration, 18 INT'L LAW.
633, 634-35 (1984) (describing the additional facility as "obsolete and therefore
useless").
242. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration, supra note 203, at 38.
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X. FINAL COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS
In the years following World War II, as arbitration was growing in
stature and in strength, much was written and said about (a) where to
arbitrate, (b) institutional arbitration versus ad hoc arbitration (that is,
arbitration managed by the parties themselves and according to their
own rules), and (c) which institution to select if the arbitration was to
be "institutional."
A checklist of "place" factors prepared by the World Arbitration
Institute of New York, promoting New York as a venue, contained the
following:
-Is the country a party to one or more of the international arbitration
conventions?
-What are the mandatory legal requirements that cannot be waived by
the parties?
-What are the limitations, if any, on arbitrable subject-matter?
-Are there limitations on arbitrators' powers?
-What is the extent of court interference in, or court assistance to,
arbitration?
-Are awards binding and readily enforceable?
-Is there review or appeal of awards? What are the grounds for setting
aside or modifying awards?
-Are competent arbitrators readily available?
-Are there arbitral institutions available for administration of
arbitration?
-What languages can easily be used?
-Are there local lawyers with experience in international arbitration
and commerce available?
-Are there facilities such as hearing rooms, reporters, and competent
translators and interpreters readily available?
-Are travel and telephone/telex communications readily available in
and out of that country?
-What are the immigration, customs, currency exchange, and tax
provisions?
-What are the relative costs of arbitrators, administration, lawyers, re-
porters, and other services and facilities in that country?"4 3
Almost every one of these items can be resolved to the maximum
beneficial extent possible by entrusting the administration of the arbi-
tration to one of the major institutions, the ones just reviewed. Their
243. WORLD ARBITRATION INSTITUTE, supra note 71, at 6. The World Arbitration
Institute defines itself as a "program" of the American Arbitration Association. Id. at
Foreword.
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rules and practices have become more and more similar with the pass-
ing of time and the accumulation of experience. The differences that
exist are not "transcendental." And when there are differences, a party
is not likely to know in advance which rule or practice will favor his
cause in any given controversy. Finally, the rules are generally flexible
enough to accommodate the engrafting of specific party-inspired rules
that are felt necessary to meet special concerns.
Ad hoc arbitration nevertheless remains a possibility. It can be fash-
ioned more closely to the needs of special circumstances, and it can be
more economical in time and money if the parties expect a continuing
relationship and are working together in a spirit of cooperation. But it
requires considerably more skill to structure, and it means that if one
of the parties is recalcitrant at the outset, there is no arbitral tribunal
in existence and no set of rules to cover the situation except the provi-
sions of applicable law. The advantage in time and money can also be
illusory. A leading Paris-based authority has opined that "ad hoc pro-
ceedings arranged outside an institutional framework generally turn
out to be frighteningly expensive. '2 44
Ad hoc arbitration functions best in the hands of specialists and then
only when the proceedings are under way. A particularly apposite ex-
ample of successful ad hoc arbitration was that between the govern-
ment of Kuwait and American Independent Oil Company (AMOCO)
in 1982. , 5 In that leading case, as in several other ad hoc oil conces-
sion arbitrations, the draftsmen of the compromis had the "benefit" of
an already existing dispute. It is substantially - and dangerously -
more difficult to provide for details when they are merely contingencies
among a plethora of possibilities. It is submitted that when the
problems of the future can only be generalized, it is safer to stay with
the rules that have been generalized, i.e., those of the major institutions
or UNCITRAL, fine-tuned by the parties as desired.
244. Paulsson, supra note 62, at 275-76. The other material in this paragraph is
drawn principally from A. REDFERN & M. HUNTER, supra note 4, at 8-9, 37-41, 113-
15 (inclining subtly but detectably toward ad hoc arbitration); see also W. STRENG &
J. SALACUSE, supra note 4, at § 30.06[B][2]; Stevenson, supra note 62, at 386-88 (dis-
cussing the difficulties of ad hoc arbitration in comparison with the institutional
method); and G. BORN & D. WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 614 (1989) (to be published; from
final galley proofs) (stating that "most experienced international practitioners prefer
the more structured, predictable character of institutional arbitration, at least in the
absence of unusual circumstances").
245. Redfern, The Arbitration Between the Government of Kuwait and Aminoil,
1984 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 65, 65; Young & Owen, Valuation Aspects of the Aminoil
Award, in 4 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 3
(R. Lillich ed. 1987).
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More important than the rules themselves, which after all allow a
very wide discretion to the parties and to the arbitrators, are the actual
practices of arbitrators. Very little has been written on this. In fact
there is almost nothing beyond mere anecdote. But one experienced in-
ternational arbitrator, Professor Andreas Lowenfeld of New York Uni-
versity Law School, has published an unusually thoughtful account of
his experiences.2 6 His conclusion is that, in practice, international arbi-
trators are tending to make the same substantive and procedural deci-
sions whatever their location and whatever their institutional sponsor-
ship. There may be differences on such things as discovery, which
American litigators favor and almost everyone else views with reserve,
including the British, but even as to this the process of convergence
proceeds apace. After a comprehensive working group study of the
question in 1986 at the VIIIth International Arbitration Congress of
the International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA), the
lead commentators, Judge Howard Holtzmann of the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal and Professor Giorgio Bernini of Bologna University, came to
the same conclusion.247 It should be added that costs are generally no
exception to this process of convergence.248
246. Lowenfeld, The Two-Way Mirror: International Arbitration as Comparative
Procedure, 7 MICH. Y.B. II'rr'L LEG. STUDIES 163-85 (1985), reprinted in W. CRAIG,
W. PARK & J. PAULSSON, supra note 46, at App. VII (the supplemented Oceana Pub-
lications Inc. loose-leaf version of the work referred to in supra note 46); see also
Lowenfeld, Singapore and the Local Bar: Aberration or Ill Omen, J. INTL ARB., Sept.
1988, at 71, 74-75 (noting that "there is a customary law of international arbitration").
247. The working group's study consisted of a hypothetical case to be administered
under various legal systems, and is reported at INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR CO?&i-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION, CONGRESS SERIES No. 3, supra note 137, at 19-171. The
Holtzmann-Bernini conclusion (at page 171) was: "This comparative analysis indicates
that there has been a gradual internationalization of practice, that traditionally sharp
lines of division between legal systems are yielding to a process of harmonization, that
there are now more basic similarities than differences ...."
248. See supra notes 62 (discussing costs of the ICC), 86 (discussing costs of the
AAA), 110 (discussing LCIA costs), 140 (discussing the SCC), 197 (discussing Swiss
costs) and 228 (discussing ICSID). Meaningful comparison of overall costs is virtually
impossible, even though attempts have been made. See generally Branson & Tupman,
Selecting an Arbitral Forum. A Guide to Cost-Effective International Arbitration, 24
VA. J. INT'L L. 917 (1984) (comparing ICC, ICSID and UNCITRAL); Stein &
Wotman, supra note 86, at 1722-24 (comparing ICC, AAA, LCIA and UNCITRAL).
Consider: (a) administrative expenses and arbitrator fees are calculated on disparate
bases (amount in dispute, time spent, reasonability); (b) wide discretion is allowed in
fixing amounts within the prescribed brackets, which themselves are quite ample; (c)
even the brackets may be exceeded, upwards or downwards, in some cases; (d) the
number of arbitrators will affect the calculation and not necessarily in direct propor-
tion; (e) arbitrators' out-of-pocket expenses are difficult to gauge in advance; (f) overall
cost includes a party's direct costs as well, and these comprise such major items as
travel for hearings and translations of documents and testimony; (g) devotion of time is
itself a cost that will vary with the actual pace of proceedings; (h) overall cost also
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A final point remains: should the arbitration clause include the desig-
nation of a venue?249 Without institutional administration this is, of
course, vital. But with it the rules universally provide for determination
by the institutions or by the arbitrators in the absence of party
choice.250 So it is not essential, but is it advisable? To this one must
respond with the militarily oracular advice that it depends on the cir-
cumstances and the nature of the terrain. A good case can be made
either way, and the authorities in fact have done just that.25 1 They are
not in agreement, although the normal human preference for instant
certainty leads more often than not to specification than to suspense." 2
The point is that it is perfectly reasonable to leave the matter for insti-
tutional determination. If the arbitrators are to be trusted to render a
fair award, and by hypothesis they are, then all the more reason they
can be trusted to make a fair determination of locale.
How good a job, then, are the major international commercial arbi-
tration institutions doing? For the group the answer is, very well in-
deed. Both their rules and their practices are promoting a beneficial
convergency in substance and procedure, while still preserving the dis-
tinct features that will lead clients and their lawyers to select one
rather than another. They are continually adapting to the evolving
needs of their constituents. Through their performance and their pro-
grams they are making of arbitration what William James called "a
live option," 253 accessible to just about anyone who can copy or ration-
includes legal fees, which may or may not be allocated wholly or partially to the
"loser"; and (i) post-award proceedings may arise either by way of judicial recourse or
internal annulment and possible re-filing (as with ICSID). A concrete case will of
course narrow the range of permutations, but even here it is with trepidation that one
ventures a preference based solely on cost. In general, and in view of the particular
services that each has to offer, it seems fair to conclude that the institutions are com-
petitive, one with another.
249. See Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural
Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REv. 647, 680 (1989) (stating that
"[ihe vital role of the arbitral situs in the viability of international arbitration derives
in large measure from the enforcement scheme of the New York Arbitration
Convention.").
250. E.g., ICC RULE 12, AAA RULE 11, LCIA RULE 7.1, SCC RULE 14(b) (pro-
viding for determination by institution or arbitrators of a venue in the absence of a
choice by the parties).
251. See Holtzmann, The Importance of Choosing the Right Place to Arbitrate an
International Case, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 183, 190 (V. Cameron ed. 1977)
(explaining that there are differences of opinion on the question, but expressing his own
preference for specification).
252. Address by Stephen R. Bond, How to Draft an Arbitration Clause 10 (June
6, 1988) (unpublished speech of ICC Court of Arbitration Secretary General) (noting
that in 57 % of the cases filed with the ICC in 1987, the arbitration clause specified the
city or country).
253. W. JAMES, THE WILL TO BELIEVE AND OTHER ESSAYS 2-4 (1917).
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ally adapt one of their model compromissory clauses.
This assessment is no more universal than the institutions are per-
fect. Professor Hans Smit, for instance, the Director of the Parker
School of Foreign and Comparative Law at Columbia University, and
co-editor of the highly useful loose-leaf service WORLD ARBITRATION
REPORTER,2 5 ' is not so sure that the present institutions can meet the
need he perceives for improvements, especially in the selection of arbi-
trators."5 For this reason and others he proposes "a single global insti-
tution that would make uniformly improved processes and facilities
available anywhere in the world. 2 58 Existing institutions would become
simply "branches."2 57 But notwithstanding the trenchancy of his com-
ments, and the prestige of their author, it is not clear to this observer
how such an ecumenical conglomerate, with its attendant layer of bu-
reaucracy, could accomplish anything more than the current institu-
tions appropriately directed and managed. 58
Heading in precisely the opposite direction is Professor Richard Bux-
baum of the University of California (Berkeley), who favors a
centrifugal dispersion: "if international commercial arbitration is to re-
main legitimate and useful, the diffusion and decentralization of what
are still fairly centralized centers of activity will be necessary." 20
While such a development - and it appears to be taking place, al-
though recently at a decelerating pace - increases the range of op-
tional modalities available for dispute resolution, it is difficult to see
how it would improve the quality of institutional performance. Quite
likely the reverse.
254. See supra notes 30, 184 (referring to the WORLD ARBIRATION REPORTER).
255. Smit, supra note 63, at 15-20, 30-32.
256. Id. at 28.
257. Id. at 30.
258. In fact, Professor Smit suggests that if the existing institutions will not join
together in a cooperative effort to create a single institution, then the ICC should take
that initiative alone. Id. at 30. This would seem like giving it the alternatives of either
(a) radically reforming its own format, or (b) giving aid and comfort to its competitors,
who offer a different style and modus arbitri. In this writer's view, most of Professor
Smit's requirements could probably be met by current institutions plus an inter-institu-
tional clearing house for data on available and potential arbitrators. What comes to
mind as a model is the skeletally staffed but remarkably efficient Swiss Arbitration
Association in Basel. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text (discussing the
Swiss Arbitration Association). For a measured consideration of institutional "network-
ing" and bilateral agreements between institutions, see Coulson, Agreements between
Arbitration Institutions - Potential for Control: Dangers of Abuse, in INTERNA-
TIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, CONGRESS SERIES No. 1, NEW
TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND
THE ROLE OF ARBITRAL AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS 33 (1983).
259. Buxbaum, Introduction to Symposium on Resolving International Commer-
cial Disputes, 4 INT'L TAx & Bus. LAw. 205, 207 (1986).
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What of the future? The area for further development would seem to
lie less with the institutions qua institutions than with the quality of the
arbitrators they supply and with the quality of the counsel the parties
supply. Regardless of its aegis, whether institutional or ad hoc, an in-
ternational arbitration is worth no more than the arbitrators and coun-
sel who conduct it.2 60 Practical, formal, and widespread training of
these is a need that to date has been largely neglected. 61 Meeting it
should be the next item on the agenda of international arbitration.
260. Lalive, International Arbitration - Teaching and Research, in CONTEMPO-
RARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 6, at 17.
261. One of the reasons for this neglect is a belief by some arbitration proponents
that the right of parties to appoint arbitrators guarantees acceptable quality. Tran-
script of Symposium on Alternative Dispute Resolution, comments of AAA President
Robert Coulson and Associate Dean Frank E.A. Sander, 35th Reunion of Harvard
Law School Class of 1953, at 18-20 (1988) (copy on file with The American University
Journal of International Law & Policy). A difficulty with this notion is that parties are
not always in a position to know, or to evaluate if they do know, the background,
experience, and past performance of potential arbitrators. Some sort of accreditation in
the style of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (CIARB) in London would appear to
be a desirable development. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (discussing
CIARB training, examination, and accreditation). Recognition is due, however, to the
efforts of the ICC and AAA in their on-going programs of seminars and specialized
sessions. See ICC 1987 ANNUAL REPORT 27 (1987) (stating that 1,000 persons at-
tended its programs for arbitrators during the year); Derains, The Future of ICC Arbi-
tration, 14 GEo. WASH. U.J. INT'L L. & ECON. 437, 441 (1980) (describing ICC edu-
cational programs); Coulson, supra note 6, at 75. The American Bar Association also
offers occasional "institutes" on the subject. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (DivI-
SION OF PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION), INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION:
PRACTICAL APPROACHES AND CONSIDERATIONS (1987) (consisting of a two-volume
work of almost 1,400 pages). Unfortunately, some of the entries consist of outlines
only, rather than full manuscripts. Of particular interest is the first academic educa-
tional program, offered since 1985 by Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen
Mary College, University of London. The school awards a postgraduate Diploma in
Arbitration Law for a full-time course of one year, consisting of two compulsory sub-
jects in international arbitration (substance and procedure) and two optional subjects
in related topics. Prospectus for Academic Session 1988/89, at 59-62. See Lew, School
of International Arbitration, London, J. INT'L ARB., Sept. 1988, at 127, 129-33. (dis-
cussing the School of International Arbitration, authored by the head of the School of
International Arbitration). Address for the Centre is 339 Mile End Road, London El
4NS.
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ANNEX: ITA Scoreboard of Treaty Adherence
(As of January 1, 1989)
N.Y. = UN Arbitration Convention of 1958.
Ratifications, accessions and successions: 78;
signatures only:. 3.
ICSID = Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes of 1965.
Ratifications, acceptances or approvals: 89;
signatures only:. 8.
MIGA = Convention Establishing the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency of 1985.
Ratifications. acceptances or approvals: 48;
signatures only: 24.
I/A = Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration of 1975.
Ratifications: 11; signatures only: 6.
USBIT = US. Bilateral Investment Treaties.
Nation N.Y. ICSI
OPIC - Agreements supporting progrars of
US. Overseas Private lnvetment
Corporation.
Symbols for adherence status are eaplaind at
end of table.
Changes since October I, 193&
Dominica acceded to UN(NY) Convention
on October 28. 1988.
Burkina Faso ratified MIGA Convention on
November 2. 1988.
Cameroon ratified MIGA Convention on
October 7, 1988.
Finland ratified MIGA Convention on
December 28. 1988.
Keny)a ratified MIGA Convention on
November 28, 1988.
Mauritius signed MIGA Convention on
November 4, 1988.






Antigua and Barbuda _NP R
Argentina S R
Australia R S
Austria R R 10
Bahamas R
Bahrain R R R
Bangladesh R R S R
Barbados R R R
Belgium R R 10
Belize S R
Benin R R S R
Bhutan
Bolivia S S R




Burkina Faso R R R R
Burma
Burundi R NP R
Byelorussian SSR R
Cambodia (Kampuchea) R
Cameroon R R R S R
Canada6  R Re
Cape Verde R
Central African Republic R R R
Chad R R
Chile R R R 10
China (Peoples Republic) R R NP R
Colombia R S R R
omoros R
Cc¢'..t JSS 1.ltr' fz. - ¢s2m tiu-4 d z
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Nation N.Y. ICSID MIGA I/A USBIT OPIC
Costa Rica R S R NP R
Cuba R 10
Cyprus R R R R
Czechoslovakia R
Denmark7  R R R* 10
Djibouti R R
Dominica R S R
Dominican Republic S R
Ecuador R R R S R
Egypt R R R S R
El Salvador S R R R
Equatorial Guinea S R
Ethiopia S R
Fiji R S R
Finland R R R* 10
Frances R R S* 10
Gabon R NP R
Gambia R R
German Democratic Republic R
Germany, Federal Republic9  R R R* 10
Ghana R R R R
Greece R R S R
Grenada R S R
Guatemala R R R
Guinea R R
Guinea-Bissau R
Guyana R S R
Haiti R S S S 1O
Holy See (Vatican City) R
Honduras S R NP R
Hungary R R R
Iceland R
India R R
Indonesia R R R NP R
Iran I
Iraq
Ireland R R S* R
Israel R R R
Italy R R R* I0
Ivory Coast R R R
Jamaica R R R
Japan R R R*
Jordan R R R R
Kenya R R R
Kiribati NP
Korea (Democratic People's Republic)
Korea (Republic) R R R R
Kuwait R R R NP
1989]
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N.Y. ICSID MIGA IUA USBT
Laos 10
Lebanon R





Luxembourg R R 0
Madagascar R R R R
Malawi R R R













NetherlandstO R R R_ to
New Zealand" R R
Nicaragua S tO
Niger R R R
Nigeria R R R R
Norway R R So to
Oman S R
Paldstan S R R R
Panama R R S 1o
PapuaNewGuinea R R
Paraguay R R to
Peru R tO
Philippines R R S R
Poland R
Portugal R R R
Qatar R
Romania R R 0
Rwanda R NP R
St. Christopher and Nevis S R
St. Lucia R R R
St.Vincent and the Grenmaines R
San Marino R
SaoTome and Principe R
SaudiArabia R R R
Senegal R R S R
Seychelles R
Sierra Leone R S R




Singapore R R _R
Soloman Islands R NP
Somalia R R
SouthAfrica R
Spain R R 10
SriLanka R R R NP R
Sudan R S R
Suriname
Swaziland R R
Sweden R R R




Thailand R S R
Togo R R R
Tonga R
Tinidad and Tobago R R R
Tunisia R R R R




Union of Soviet Socialist Republics R
United Arab Emirates R NP
United Kingdom'2  R R R* 10
United States ofAmerica 3  R R R* S N/A N/A




Western Samoa R R R
Yemen Arab Republic S R
Yemen, People's Democratic Republic
Yugoslavia R R R
Zaire R S S R
Zambia R R R
Zimbabwe I I I
Notes: (1) Automatically applicable to metropolitan and overseas constituent territorial subdivisions but not
automatically applicable to overseas dependent territories. More important overseas coverage is noted at appro-
priate entry. Consult UN or ITA for doubts. Under Art. 1(3), 49 states have made "reciprocity reservation" and
28 states have made "commercial reservation". (2) Automatically applicable to metropolitan and overseas con-
stituent territorial subdivisions and to overseas dependent territories unless specifically excluded. All current
exclusions are noted at appropriate entry. (3) Asterisk (*) after symbol indicates capital-exporting country per
Schedule A to the Convention. (4) A bilateral investment treaty will be listed as being ratified only when it has
been ratified by both signatories. (5) OPIC agreements are regarded as inoperable ("10") when, for one reason
or another, OPIC is not currently making future commitments as to that country (but see Notes 8. 10, 11 and
12 for local exceptions). (6) N.Y.: includes federal, all 10 provincial and both territorial jurisdictions (see Art.
XI). (7) N.Y.: includes Faroe Islands and Greenland. (8) N.Y.: includes, inter alla, French Guiana, French
Polynesia, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Mayotte, New Caledonia, Reunion, and St. Pierre and Miquelon. OPIC
operable in French Guiana. (9) N.Y. and ICSID: includes West Berlin. (10) N.Y.: includes Aruba and Nether-
lands Antilles. OPIC operable in Aruba and Netherlands Antilles. (11) ICSID: excludes Cook Islands, Niue
and Tokelau. OPIC operable in Cook Islands. (12) N.Y.: includes Bermuda, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Hong Kong,
Isle of Man and Cayman Islands. ICSID: excludes British Indian Ocean Territory, Pitcairn Islands, British
Antarctic Territory and Sovereign Base Areas of Cyprus. OPIC operable in Northern Ireland and Anguilla.
(13) N.Y.: includes, inter alia, Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands.
Symbols:
S: Signed but not ratified
R: Ratified or accepted
NP: Negotiations pending
Sources:
Interviews January II to 23, 1989, with Mr. Antonio R. Parra and Mr.
Leigh P. Hollywood, World Bank; Mr. John Zylman, Office of the Legal
Adviser, U.S. Department of State; Mr. Lorin Weisenfeld, Overseas Pri-
